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IN LUCE TUA 
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor 
What Ever Happened to Civil Rights?- // 
Is the Reagan Administration racist? Black leaders are 
asking that question-a question that implies its own 
answer-with a degree of intensity and even despera-
tion that reflects the pervasive discontent within the 
black community over the state of race relations in 
America today. 
As we suggested last month , we do not share the view 
that either the current Administration or the society at 
large has capitulated to racism. While cmTents of racial 
prejudice continue to flow in America, they probably 
run less deep-they certainly have less legitimacy -
than they have in the past. There's still a lot of redneck 
racism out there, but among the generally well-educated 
people who make the society's most important political 
and economic decisions, racism- at least the overt and 
socially-damaging racism of the past-no longer holds 
sway. The movement toward racial equality has indeed 
fallen on hard times, but those hard times have to do 
less with resurgent racism or moral indifference than 
with a genuine sense of bafflement over how best to 
proceed. 
As was also noted last month, we need not presuppose 
any deep moral sensibilities on the part of white Ameri-
cans to imagine that they understand that the degrada-
tion of black people operates little more in the interests 
of whites than of blacks. Slums, poverty, and the social 
pathologies that go with them degrade us all , regardless 
of color and regardless of the state of our moral imagin-
ations. Whatever psychic benefits some whites might 
derive from clinging to a sense of racial superiority, 
those c~n hardly compensate in America today for the 
grievous and evident social costs that racial inequal ity 
exacts with respect to crime rates, welfare expenditures, 
visual blight, civil disorder, and the general deteriora-
tion of the social fabric. 
Assuming, then, that even those of the most modest 
good will must see that invidious racial di tinctions 
harm us all, how do we account for the persistence of 
racial inequality? It is our collective dilemma that 
the answer to that question involves us in so many com-
plexities, ambiguities, and ideological conundrums that 
we are tempted to tum from it in despair to other social 
problems that, however difficult or even intractable, 
offer at least some promise of return on our efforts to 
deal with them. The tragedy of civil rights in America 
today is not that nothing has been tried, but that o 
much has been tried to so little avail. This is not to say 
that we have done enough-clearly we have not - but 
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rather that our problem consists les in summoning up 
the will to do more than in figuring out just what it is 
that we should be doing more of. 
It would be wrong, of cour e, to ugge t that nothing 
has changed for black people in Am rica. In our under-
standable despair over how far we hav y t to go, we 
ought not forget how far we hav already come. In the 
area of race relation , we ar e a tran formed ociety 
from what we were a quarter-century ago. An article 
a while back in th liberal ew Republic argu d that 
the civil r ights mov ment of the pa t f w d cade ha 
produced "the mo t ma iv change in racial attitud , 
in behavior by white , and in th law that ev r ha b en 
wrought peacefully in a major indu trial country." I-
lowing for a mea ur of hyp rbole, and acknowl dging 
as well that the d gre of chan e may u ge t more a to 
how awful thing w re befor than a to how much b tter 
they ar now, it remain tru that th t rm "civil righ t 
revolution" involve mor than a loo figur of p h . 
T he marche , the d mon tration , th moral app al 
the suffering: th e w r n t all for nothin . By any 
reasonable m a ur thing ar ub tantially b tt r for 
black peopl in merica toda than th y w r a f 1 0. 
Yet so much mi ery r main . h figur n th in i-
dence among black of pov rty un mpl ym nt, f mil 
disintegration, ill gitimate birth, and r main 
depressing, and in many ca th y continu to h ad in 
the wrong direction. For v ry datum of impr v m nt 
we might point to anoth r, ontrary tati tic an b 
summoned to make any talk of pro r app ar mind-
lessly optimi ti . om thin t 11 our Iv mu t 
be done. And it i at thi p int that w b gin falling all 
over our good int ntion and xpr ion f o d will 
and getting preci ly nowh r . If rh tori uld mak 
our race problem right , mi ry and in quality would 
long ince hav b en 1 ft b hind u . Poli y, h w v r 
pre ent a few mor probl m . 
The Reagan dmini trati n i op rating on th b-
viou a umption that th lib ral p Ii i m di d 
in the Gr at oci ty and in ub qu nt imilar pr ram 
have fail d and n d to b dra ti ally r vi d, if n t 
imply di carded. Th dmini trati n want a harp 
break with th pa t and it i th pr of makin that 
break that ha~ arou d th ri f pr t t indignati n 
and outrag that i u fr m i il ri ht 1 ad r with 
ho th 
uffering that li 
predictable rhetoric-n d to b 
fir t examin with om car th 
make again t th old poli i 
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History may well record that the worst error the modern civil rights movement made was to 
invest so much of its time, energy, and moral fervor in such a dubious cause as school busing. 
would offer as substitutes. 
The first argument is obvious enough: if things are 
as bad among black people as everyone suggests, then 
the liberal social welfare policies of the Sixties and 
Seventies have not delivered on their promises. Presi-
dent Reagan's budget-makers argue that it makes no 
sense to send huge new amounts of government money 
down the same dead-end road of social failure that has 
already swallowed up immense expenditures in the past. 
Those who argue that we have not spent enough may 
have a case, but they should first lo6k at the figures. 
In 1964, the federal government spent 34 billion on 
human resources programs ( education, health, income 
security, nutrition, public assistance, etc.), a figure 
that amounted to just short of 29 per cent of the budget. 
By 1981, the dollar figure had risen tenfold to 349 
billion, and, even more striking, that figure now rep-
resented over 53 per cent of the total budget. (The Reagan 
projections in social welfare spending, by the way, would 
reduce that portion of the budget by just 1.5 per cent 
over the course of several years.) 
Not all that money goes to the poor, of course, and by 
no means all or most of the poor are black, but given 
the record, conservatives might be forgiven their skep-
ticism concerning liberal arguments that identify the 
well-being of black Americans with ever larger and 
more expensive federal programs. If so much money 
has brought such ambiguous results in the past, what 
reason have we for supposing that major new expendi-
tures will bring significant improvement? Conservatives 
are often too glib in their argument that problems can-
not be solved simply by throwing money at them, but 
it seems clear that in the case of the difficultues of the 
urban black community, they have at least something of 
a point. Welfare, for example, has been and remains an 
essential life-saver for many black families ( a point 
conservatives often overlook), but social critics from 
all over the political spectrum have noted its tendency 
to promote such social ills a dependency and family 
disintegration. 
The Reagan Administration contend that its emphasis 
on cutting the rate of inflation and on rejuvenating 
the economy through its taxing and pending policies 
will do more for black people- and for all other Ameri-
cans-than any combination of government programs 
could hope to do. (The Administration charge , with 
some justification, that liberal have tended to ignore 
the social costs of inflation and to di regard the role 
of social welfare spending in purring inflation.) Presi-
dent Reagan has in effect adopted John Kennedy's 
maxim that a rising tide lift all boats. Poverty, he 
argues, is best fought by a generally buoyant economy 
(with the buoyancy provided by supply- ide incentives) 
rather than by specifically-targeted federal programs. 
4 
One can find economists and economic theories on 
either side of this argument, and it is one of those mat-
ters best resolved in practice rather than in theoretical 
dispute, especially since both sides to the dispute often 
seem as driven by ideological commitment as by em-
pirical analysis. It would seem that the debate over 
supply-side economics and its attendant doctrines has 
been conducted entirely too much as an exercise in 
quasi-theological dogmatics. Economics should be 
approached as a pragmatic science, not as a moral bat-
tlefield or an object of faith. 
The President and his advisors may well be right on 
the major issues, and if they can manage to get the econ-
omy moving again while simultaneously limiting in-
flation, they will indeed have accomplished more for 
black people than any programmatic war on poverty 
could be expected to do. But if they are wrong, urban 
blacks and other poor people-all those who have been 
most affected by the cutbacks in social spending-will 
have carried a cruelly disproportionate share of a 
losing enterprise. 
And even if they are right, the Reaganites often seem 
not to understand that even the most heal thy economy 
will include in it people who, on either a short or long 
term basis, cannot make it entirely on their own. It is 
true that a number of Great Society programs intended 
to benefit the less fortunate worked badly or not at all, 
but a number of others did work, and even many of 
those that did not need to be reconceived and revital-
ized rather than simply scrapped. We need a good deal 
more pluralism and private sector involvement in our 
human resources programs, but many of those programs 
remain necessary in some form, and they cannot all 
simply be dumped into the hands of sweet charity. A 
careful scrutiny of the President's budget cuts indi-
cates that the assault on social welfare programs is not 
as all-encompassing as partisan rhetoric sometimes 
suggests, but extreme care must be taken in seeing to it 
that in the Administration's program taken whole 
( social welfare policies pl us overall effects of monetary 
and fiscal policy), the poor, black and white alike, not 
wind up a net losers. 
On two other is ues in dispute between civil rights 
leaders and the Administration- busing and quota -
we think the Administration is clearly in the right. 
History may well record that the wor t error the modern 
civil right movement (the NAACP in particular) e er 
made wa to inve t so much of its time energy, and 
moral fervor in such a dubious cause as chool bu ing. 
The attempt to require racial balance in the chool 
(busing may originally have been intended as a mean 
to end segregation, but it quickly became an in trument 
of forced integration) lacked either a mas con tituenc 
or a plau ible rationale. Most parents black and white 
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As sophisticated political strategists, most civil rights leaders understand that achievement 
of the things they want will depend on forging alliances with sympathetic non-black groups. 
were reluctant to send their children out of their neigh-
borhoods to attend distant schools, especially when 
those schools were perceived, often correctly, as edu-
cationally inferior or even physically dangerous. Those 
who favored busing were seldom those whose own 
children were involved. 
No one ever explained why racial balance was neces-
sary to achieve decent education for black children, 
and the apparent assumption that those children could 
only learn effectively in the presence of some critical 
mass of white children understandably struck many 
blacks as condescending at best. Busing wasted money 
that would better have been spent in classrooms; it 
created unnecessary racial and class divisions; and, 
after all that, it wound up failing anyway: one school 
system after another on which busing was imposed re-
segregated itself through white flight. The current 
Congressional attempt to legislate the end of court-
ordered busing is constitutionally irresponsible, but 
the blame for it rests as much on an arbitrary and ab-
solutist judiciary as on opportunistic politicians. Well-
intentioned people supported busing because it seemed 
a symbol of a noble end; seldom has the price of sym-
bolic politics been so high. 
To treat the issue of quotas satisfactorily would re-
quire more space than is here available. Our brief 
treatment must begin with precise definition: affirma-
tive action need not, though in practice it often does, 
imply a system of quotas. No one can reasonably object 
to efforts to seek out qualified members of minority 
groups for educational or occupational advancement, 
nor is it wrong that disadvantaged minorities be of-
fered special training or remedial opportunities to 
improve their levels of qualification. But when af-
firmative action shades into quotas, when efforts to 
make equality of opportunity more meaningful get 
transformed into demands for mandated equality of 
condition, then legitimate objections arise. 
Quota systems do require reverse discrimination, 
as the Bakke case clearly demonstrated, and those thus 
discriminated against are in many cases themselves 
members of ethnic groups that can in no reasonable 
way be classified among the privileged classes in Amer-
ica. The idea that advancement in our society should 
come without regard to attributes of ancestry, class, 
or religion stand at the very heart of the American 
idea and attempts to remedy prior violation of that 
ideal through a system of group rights that impo es 
new modes of discrimination while it subverts the ideal 
itself make no moral sense. Acts of racial discrimina-
~on require compensation, but the basis for judgment 
In uch ca es should, in equity, be specific and indi-
idual, and not simply a mark of color. Quotas often 
work in favor of those in minority group lea t likely 
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to have been victims of educational or occupational 
discrimination. Black applicants to law and medical 
chools, after all, like their white counterparts, tend 
to come from the middle cla s, not from depressed ur-
ban slums. 
What all the e controver ies b tween the Reagan 
Administration and its civil right critics add up to, we 
think, is a considerable amount of genuine disagree-
ment compounded by ignificant do e of misund r-
standing and mutual incomprehen ion. (We pa over 
here the matter of th tax-ex mpt status of chools 
that practice some form of di crimination. The Admin-
istration handled thi v ry badly, but inc it ha in-
troduced legislation to forbid in law th tax benefits 
formerly denied by IR r gulation th r s m to be 
no substantial point of disagre ment.) What ver ide 
one takes on these particular i ue , th r r main th 
larger que tion of wh re the civil rights mov m nt 
goes from here and what politi al trat gi it follow 
in getting where it want to go. 
It strikes us a a po itive d velopm nt that advocat 
of black power appear I dominant in th black om-
munity than they once wer . Th point, f our e, i 
not that black hould he itate to mobiliz am 
forms of political and conomi inOuenc that other 
groups have put tog ther to a -or force-th ir way 
into the American main tream. But black p wer a in-
terpreted by, say, a tokely Carmi hael m d a all 
for separate development that, how v r r mantically 
attractive as a manif to of indep nd nc , could only 
be ultimately lf-d f ating in a o i ty that i almo t 
90 per cent non-bla k. Image of "bla k pow r" r 
"white power" polariz th i ty dang r u ly; th y 
are al o fal e in th ir ug tion of m nolithically-
opposed entitie . Tuer i no "whit power" in Am rica 
becau e no cohe iv whit community xi t . 
As ophi ticat d political trat i t mo t ivil right 
leaders under tand that a hi v m nt of the thing 
they want will dep nd on for ing allianc with ympa-
thetic non-black group . That i th b ginning of po-
litical wi dom, but it may b that th kind of coali-
tion envi ioned fail to co r th full rang of int r t 
and ituation r pre nt d in th black community. 
When civil righ lead r p ak of allian with other 
groups, they t nd to do o in t rm only of left-wing 
cla politic . 
In it extrem form uch talk mploy imag of 
ocial tran formation and of a whol n word r of thing . 
typical r c nt propo al ima in d a political program 
ba ed on mas ive n w go ernm nt anti-pov rty pro-
gram , olidarity with Third W rld lib ration mov -
ment , and d velopm nt at local 1 1 of alt rnative 
to capitali m. How v r on r a t p r onally to uch a 
vi ion, it i clear that it i not on likely to hav wide 
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America is predominantly a middle-class society, and any political or social movement 
that does not recognize that-and act accordingly-will condemn itself to ultimate futility . 
appeal for the American public, and coalitions based 
upon it will have little prospect of political success. 
Even more moderate versions of this brand of politics 
tend to frame their programs along lines that exclude 
middle-class concerns (inflation, erime, social insta-
bility) and that restrict their constituency entirely to 
the poor, the unemployed, and other social victims. 
To some extent, of course, this is inevitable. Given 
the concentration of so many blacks at the bottom of 
the socioeconomic structure, any political program put 
together by black organizations that ignored the con-
cerns of the disadvantaged would be both unrealistic 
and morally culpable. Yet two matters need always to 
be kept in mind in this regard. First, as we have already 
noted, it is not necessarily true that government social 
welfare programs provide the only or even the best 
route to economic improvement for the poor. (New 
Deal social programs put a floor on the sufferings of 
the working class during the Depression, but they were 
not the engine of the postwar prosperity that lifted the 
working class to comparative affluence.) And that mat-
ter quite aside, it is simply inaccurate to assume, as so 
much of the civil rights movement's rhetoric tends to 
do, that all black people are poor and dependent. 
There is now a large black middle class composed 
of millions of people whose problems and possibilities 
can no longer be defined within the old categories of 
poverty, oppression, and powerlessness. The black 
community is not a monolith, and it seems politically 
self-defeating for it to act as if it were. Is it not possible 
for civil rights organizations to maintain their com-
mitment to those within the black community who have 
not made it and yet begin to address themselves as well 
to the concerns of those who have? America is pre-
dominantly a middle-class society, and any political 
or social movement that does not recognize that-and 
act accordingly-will condemn itself to ultimate futility. 
Not all black people are social victims, and a truly 
comprehensive black politics will have to go beyond 
the assumptions and stances that the theory of victim-
ization imposes. Our history demonstrates, as in the 
case of Jews and Orientals, that there is room in the 
interstices of American society for oppressed minority 
groups to make a place for themselves and begin the 
long ascent out of their oppressed status. Black Ameri-
cans, who have suffered quantitatively and qualitatively 
as no other group has, have nonetheless begun that 
ascent, and it is time more notice were taken of that by 
black and white alike. 
To move out of victim status is to get beyond the 
mood and rhetoric of hopelessness, resentment, and 
comfortable (but ineffectual) moralism that can keep 
individuals and groups trapped in their own sense of 
futility. It may provide psychological comfort to dwell 
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on charges of "racism" or "social meanness," but it would 
not seem to be very socially useful. (The once-searing 
term "racist" has been so cheapened by casual and in-
appropriate use that it has almost entirely lost its ca-
pacity to shock, outrage, or shame.) Only a fool would 
deny that prejudice still exists and still inflicts social 
and economic damage, but it is not the all-devouring 
monster it once was, and it no longer has the power it 
formerly had to condemn virtually all blacks to lives 
devoid of broad social decency. 
Black people today hold more of their fate in their 
own hands than ever before, which makes it appropri-
ate for such black social critics as the brilliant economist 
Thomas Sowell to emphasize internal elements of black 
culture, rather than external elements of white atti-
tudes, in assessing the condition of the black community 
today. When Sowell and others include matters of family 
instability, social indiscipline, and educational un-
preparedness in accounting for the economic plight of 
poor blacks, they are not involved, as is so often charged, 
in a process of "blaming the victim." They are rather 
attempting a realistic analysis of those elements within 
the black community itself that contribute to the agonies 
it endures. (Those who would dismiss Sowell as an un-
representative conservative might note that the Rever-
end Jesse Jackson of PUSH, whom no one has accused 
of conservative leanings, has been saying many of the 
same things Sowell does for some time now.) 
It is time our discussion of racial matters got beyond 
certain taboos or habits of self-censorship. Those who 
insist, for example, on identifying concern over the 
crime rate in the black community as a cover ("code 
word") for racism inhibit necessary conversation on a 
critical issue. Black crime hurts blacks more than it 
does whites, since more of it is visited on blacks, but 
it is a matter of general community concern not only in 
itself, but also for its poisonous contribution to racial 
antagonisms. It is not too much to say that the major 
feeling most whites have toward blacks today, especially 
young male urban blacks, is not hatred or indifference, 
but fear. That fear, and what it does to our racial atti-
tude , needs to be talked about much more openly than 
it now is. 
But it is not, in the end, with the feelings or fears of 
whites that discussion of civil rights issues should pre-
occupy itself. It is rather with black people themselves, 
what they want, and how they might, with the help of 
the rest of us, go about getting it. And that means talking 
about the political economy and how it really works, 
and how the concerns and programs of the old liberal-
ism might be blended with certain new, possibly even 
conservative, remedies to create, not the racial para-
dise that it makes no sense yet to dream of, but a livable 
and decent society. Cl 
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The Quest for Quality 
A Christian Approach to the Liberal Arts 
Larry J. Alderink 
Can any praise be worthy of the Lord's majesty? How mag-
nificent his strength! How inscrutable his wisdom! Humans 
are your creatures, Lord, and their instinct is to praise you. 
They bear about themselves the mark of death, the sign of 
their own si"n, to remind them that you thwart the proud. But 
still, since they are part of your creation, they wish to praise 
you. The thought of you stfrs them so deeply that they cannot 
be content unless they praise you, because you made us for 
yourself and our hearts find no peace unti"l they rest in you. 
St. Augustine 
You could attach pn:Ces to thoughts. Some cost a lot, some a 
little. And how does one pay for thoughts? The answer, I 
think, is: wi"th courage. 
Ludwi"g Wittgenstein 
In this paper I want to ask: What draws us to engage in 
liberal arts, and to do that to the best of our ability? 
What propels us to commit ourselves to liberal arts and 
to commit ourselves with thoughtfulness and vitality? 
I will first indicate some possible reasons for seeking 
knowledge, next venture a suggestion regarding the 
character of knowledge, then consider a way of connect-
ing knowledge and action, and finally propose a way of 
thinking about criteria against which quality or degrees 
of it can be measured. 
In order to get started, we may assume a tentative def-
inition of quality to guide us: quality is what is done 
with what is available, with regard to certain standards. 
After all, we ought to pursue quality. We who study here 
should strive for excellence. What do we say to tho e 
who join us? One thing we say is that knowledge is worth 
eeking and worth having. 
Larry J. Alderink is Associate Professor of Religion at Con-
cordia College, Moorhead, Minnesota. He earned his B.A. 
at Calvin College, his B.D. at Calvin Seminary, and his M.A. 
and Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. He is the author of 
Creation and alvation in Ancient Orphism and has writ-
ten articles on ancient Greek religion for Religiou tudi 
Review and umen. This paper was origi"nally prepared for 
internal discussion at Concordia College, and is publ£shed 
here because the issues it addresses concern Christian higher 
educati"on in general. 
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I. THE SES OF K OWLEDGE 
Thesis # 1: that knowledge is not onl an end in itself, but 
also serves an end beyond itself. 
fr m 
pur uit and v n 
d ply r wardin 
transmission f kn wl-
' and h r failur 
n mi tak may b a 
id th p 1-
f nd 
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The task of learning cannot be merely to systematize findings or organize predictions. The task of 
learners is to compete with each other so that both the weaker and the stronger case may be heard. 
incompatible hypothesis. Frequently we can learn the 
features of an idea by contrasting two or more ideas 
rather than by using the idea to interpret phenomena. 
A further reason to entertain inco·mpatible and con-
flicting theories is that there are few if any theories 
which comport perfectly with all known facts the the-
ories purport to explain. Consequently, the task oflearn-
ing cannot be merely-if at all- to systematize findings 
or to organize predictions. Rather, the task of learners is 
to compete with each other in order that both the weak-
er and the stronger case may be heard. Such clashes and 
competition mean that both internal and external crit-
icism move learners beyond acquiring information and 
dividing into schools of opinion; even gathering in-
formation is an activity contaminated by theory and 
even by interest. 
Occasionally a whole body of theories is called into 
question. Sometimes centers do not hold and things fall 
apart. Those are exciting times, for we catch a glimpse 
of a third reason for seeking knowledge: ideolog£cal. 
Normally we are trained in disciplines by learning to 
ask particular questions in particular ways. Progress is 
made by asking conventional questions because we have 
conventional questions to ask. Without conventions, 
standards could not exist, and a scholar in one city could 
not understand a paper by another scholar in a different 
city. But when fundamental questions-those lying at 
the bottom of a discipline or a group of disciplines-
are changed, a radical change is under way. 
Here a basic shift occurs: conventional or normal 
questions and procedures no longer produce results 
because the conditions which make them fruitful and 
productive have changed. What was once normal or 
paradigmatic becomes antiquarian (unless someone re-
vives it). U ually such a basic shift happens when one of 
two conditions obtain: when new discoverie occur so 
rapidly that an existing set of theories cannot account 
for them, or when a discipline calcifies becaus it po -
tulates are incapable of extension or development. 
Such times of crisis permit u to ee that the pursuit 
of knowledge is not an end in it elf. or do inquirer 
give up on knowledge when they find their per pective 
undergoing radical change; they become excited anew 
and scurry to learn new ways to learn. Having and un-
dermining convention feed into the ideological u e 
of knowledge. We come to think about thinking. 
By "ideological u e of knowledge" I mean that knowl-
edge is used to serve the purposes and intere ts of a 
class or a group. I also mean to say that purpose and 
interest are always involved in seeking knowledge, al-
though this use may be concealed from time to time and 
in one way or another. There is, of course, a wide range 
in interests and groups. One class might be the working 
class which, by uniting would have nothing to lose but 
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its chains. Another might be capitalists who by diversi-
fying and internationalizing would be able to perpetu ate 
their hold on markets and means of production. In any 
case, a school such as Concordia claims its own ideologi-
cal interest (indeed, proclaims it!): 
The purpose of Concordia College is to influence the affairs of the 
world by sending into society thoughtful and informed men and 
women dedicated to the Christian life. 
If it is the case that knowledge does serve the interests 
of a group or a class, and if Concordia College explicitly 
announces that ideological purpose, one well may won-
der about the connection between knowledge and inter-
est, between knowledge and the purposes it serves. We 
may even ask what knowledge is. 
II. THE CHARACTER OF KNOWLEDGE 
Thesis #2: that knowledge is not defined by some universal 
standard and does not have a perspective-invariant meaning, 
but is determined by the perspective in which it is embedded 
and the ideolog£cal purpose it intends to serve. 
Of course knowledge is not some free-floating entity, 
self-contained and absolute, which is there for us to 
grab and to ingest. Before having knowledge or talking 
about it, we must create it since it isn't there for the 
plucking like apples on a tree. Knowledge is something 
knowers have. Knowledge is something selves have, 
and before having it, create it. One might expect that 
since there are different views of what selves are, each 
view of selves would include its own account of knowers 
and knowledge. 
If it is the case that "knowledge" is not to be given a 
perspective-invariant meaning, and if the meaning of 
"knowledge" is related to a view of human selfhood and 
particularly self-as-knower, it behooves us to consider 
what may be a useful and valuable construct of the two. 
On the one hand, one might hold that the root of many 
if not most of the problems in human life can be traced 
to our lack of knowledge. Where ignorance is considered 
to be our problem, knowledge is rightly held to be the 
olution. On this view, we ought to have great faith in 
reason for it will further the march from superstition to 
enlightenment, from bondage to nature to harnessing 
natures force for human good, from enslavement to 
liberation. On thi view, education is redemptive, if not 
redemption itself! 
On the other hand, one might think it important to 
mine the Christian tradition for another tarting point. 
At the core of the Christian tradition lie the claim that 
human being are related to God- and that this relation 
has embedded in it certain re pon ibilities and obliga-
tion . The claim i that we human are o constituted a 
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to bear certain duties. We are responsible to God for 
acting in ways appropriate for humans to act with re-
gard to their Creator. To the Creator for creation we are 
in duty bound to thank, praise, serve, and obey God. 
From this primary responsibility is derived the belief 
that we have two further responsibilities. We are re-
sponsible to our fellow humans to act with regard to 
each other's potential (i.e., not to squander the best in 
us or to betray our capabilities, but to strive for human 
fulfillment; not to seek domination of one group or 
gender over another, but to strive for liberation of us 
all). We are responsible to nature for acting in ways 
appropriate for humans to act with regard to the world 
around us as custodians and tewards. 
One Christian tradition calls these responsibilities a 
"cultural mandate." Another tradition speaks of voca-
tion and includes economic and political orders as well 
as the ecclesiastical order. The goal is to exerci e voca-
tion or calling whatever the station may be in the orders 
of creation, the interconnected and interdependent pat-
terns, which are the world. In both cases, th di tinction 
between sacred and secular realms of life tends to be 
obliterated. The task which comes with being born hu-
man, then, is the ta k to engage in cultural activity: to 
make the world a habitation fit for human living, to 
humanize the world, to make the world a home. 
Frequently this task and these respon ibiliti s are 
called the "image of God": only human beings bear a 
creative resemblance to their Creator, and only human 
beings have the capacity to create as their Creator 
created them, and thus reflect their Creator's likeness. 
What else could be the norm for being human: called 
to obey and to love the rules which specify our respon-
ibilities to God-the very responsibilities which reveal 
our creaturely character, the very rules which are nei-
ther imposed on us by a dictatorial deity nor yet alien 
to our deepe t nature? Where else could we look for en-
joyment but to the discharging of our responsibilitie to 
God-in-the-world, with our fellow humans? As earth-
ling , a brothers and si ters to the beasts and bird , w 
et reflect the Creator of all reality. On thi vi w, cul-
tural activity i neither redemptive nor casual· learning 
and knowledge belong to us merely becau e we ar 
created. 
than tru tful ob dienc , rebellion against r pon ibil-
itie become characteri tic- mutilation rather than tew-
ard hip for nature domination and victimization 
rather than human dev lopm nt for our elv and ur-
rogate gods rather than creativ reflection of th tru 
God. 
interpretiv t rm . 
allow er atur 
re olv 
of ren wal becom 
a th ir own n rm. n-
mo t triking and blatant a ti it 
tru tin 
rvi . h r in Ii 
w 11-b ing (eudaim onia) i 
f human r n wal . 
Alth ugh "hat I 
in 
qualit . 
1. that r a 
b in . r 
rv1 in th au 
m ti ati n 
th m ar 
Beyond creation, Chri tians hold, lie a Fall. Regret-
tably and unfortunately and in freedom and knowl-
ed e human being lo e their grip on their tatu . t 
th ame time that we lo e hold of God, we lo hold on 
our elves· in becoming alien to God we becom alien 
to our elve and to each other; in mis ing what we ar 
aimed at we come al o to dislike and even to de pi 
our fellow creature , the birds of the air and th b a t 
of the field and the fields them elve . All mann r of vil 
i unlea bed ome of which i vi ible e en toda . Rather whi h pla nt-
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We should understand that faith is neither the lord nor master of our being. '"Having 
faith" does not provide the solution to moral, social, political, or scientific dilemmas. 
ly, education is not in and of itself redemptive. Be-
cause of our fallen condition reason itself stands in 
need of redemption, both in its operations and in 
its purposes. 
2. that faith is neither the lord nor master of our 
being. "Having faith" does not provide the solution 
to moral , social , political , or scientific dilemmas. 
Frequently, faith is understood to be believing that 
God has saved one's soul for eternal salvation, with 
the consequence that only faith should provide 
answers for worldly affairs , or that one's life-in-the-
world is largely a matter of indifference. Such a no-
tion of faith severs faith from the activity of created 
beings which is the focus of divine redemption, and 
makes salvation exclusively an other-worldly 
matter. 
3. that Creation and Redemption focus essentially on 
the world as we know it, on the world in which we 
live. The created world is the world God made and 
the redeemed world is the world God redeems. Al-
though Redemption includes more than this world, 
it certainly involves a view of restoring the world 
to the intentions God had in creating it and of re-
covering what was lost or rendered defective by the 
Fall. 
4. that scholarship and education have to do with the 
object of Creation and Redemption: the world. To 
subordinate Creation to Redemption would result 
in holding that Christians have more skill or intel-
ligence or some other advantage which non-Chris-
tians lack, with the consequence that Christian 
scholarship and education are by virtue of being 
Christian superior to other forms of scholarship 
and education. In distinction, because scholars and 
learners from a wide spectrum of perspectives seek 
to understand and interpret and order the creation, 
it is the quality and persuasiveness of reasons, argu-
ments, interpretations, theories, and constructs 
which mu t compete with each other. In other 
words, the academic disciplines have to do with the 
first article of the Creed; for Christians, the activitie 
are influenced by the second article of the Creed in 
an explicit and acknowledged fashion. 
5. that there is an ultimate good, a summum bonum 
which human beings typically seek. Clearly, a gen-
eral order of things or a cosmic pattern which beck-
ons us to pursue certain ends cannot be some merely 
external order· were it merely external , we could 
neither know it nor seek it. Nor could such a gen-
eral order be imposed on us by some being external 
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to us; were that the case, whatever claimed to be our 
highest good couldn't be our highest good. Hence, 
our highest good and a general meaning of things 
must be found, if it is to be found at all, in what 
humans typically and characteristically seek and do. 
To begin with what is characteristically sought in 
particular situations does not exclude what is gen-
eral or universal; indeed, what is typically sought 
suggests a general seeking. This, I hold, is what 
Christianity designates service to God whose par-
ticular term is the renewal of human life and the 
liberation of human beings from the enslavement 
in which they exist. 
III. KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION 
Thesis #3: that knowledge is related to action by way of 
world-making or enterprise or work. 
To this point I have tried to indicate a source to which 
some educators can turn for an answer to the question: 
what do we have to work with? That source, I think, is 
found in the Creation-Fall-Redemption view of human 
existence. That, as I suggested, helps us partially an-
swer the question of quality in education. We should 
now venture an answer to a second question: what to do? 
Obviously, human beings in general and students or 
learners in particular do all sorts of things. But if we 
begin with the assumption that our doing has a telos or 
a goal, we may inquire into certain tendencies or dis-
positions which are fit for the telos. And if we assume a 
coherence between a telos and our well-being or eudai-
monia, we may ask about those tendencies or dispositions 
which conduce towards the goal. 
Developing tendencies is clearly instrumental to act-
ing in responsible ways. Truth-seeking and truth-telling, 
justice, courage, creativity, curiosity, reflection, all 
these qualities and many others are instrumental to and 
indeed produce the goal of well-being. Conversely, 
lying, theft, betrayal, and other similar qualities detract 
from well-being, even though they may bring pleasure 
or wealth or fame. But the virtuous tendencies and the 
vicious tendencies are not only instrumental; a life 
characterized by virtuous tendencies is inherently worth 
living, whereas a life marked by vicious tendencies is the 
worst life conceivable or possible. 
One might speak of the soul or personhood to iden-
tify those features which make one most truly oneself. 
We might picture human souls or persons as twisted 
and crooked by their habits and pursuits, or, alternately, 
as happy and joyful in living well. Here we have a kind 
of self-reflection on what matters mo t to people, on the 
center from which people live and act. The self-knowl-
edge produced by such reflection constitutes knowing 
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who one is and being true to oneself, and taking re-
sponsibility for one's most fundamental beliefs; at the 
opposite of self-knowledge stands ignorance, or not 
knowing what is second-hand and bogu and shallow in 
oneself. 
Frequently such a picture is thought to be subjective. 
Is the picture-including the values, beliefs, disposi-
tions, and behavior which are features of the picture -
a matter of choice, in which case it cannot be thought to 
be true or false, good or bad, or anything in between? 
Is the picture a matter of feeling or taste, in which case 
one reaches bottom when one says, "That's the way I 
feel, and that's that"? 
It is frequently held, on the other hand, that there are 
some areas of life which are not matters of choice or 
feeling. These areas are those where science yields 
knowledge. Here the self isn't the proper object of 
knowledge; the world is. Here the proper procedure is 
not self-reflection and the yield self-knowledge; the 
proper procedure consists of techniques which can be 
used by other researchers and experiments which can 
be repeated by others to obtain the same result . 
So we often conclude that self-knowledge is personal 
and subjective, whereas world-knowledge is impersonal 
and objective. By and large, the humanities deal with 
humans and the sciences with the world and observable 
behavior of objects of the world. Somehow, on this view, 
humans are more apart from the world than they are a 
part of it-rather like lords and ladies who divide 
among themselves their respective tasks. 
A view common in our century is that a wide gap does 
exist between subjective and objective, between human 
and non-human, between humanities and sciences. One 
famous author has even written of "two cultures" and a 
growing rift between them. A clear expression of such a 
view is found in Freudian psychology, to which we owe 
one of the most pervasive images of what it means to be 
human beings. It would seem, from this per pective, 
that humans are divided into two parts and inhabit two 
worlds. During the day we live in a real world where 
law of motion are regularly followed, where wishe mu t 
be harnessed for the purposes uf civilization, where the 
laws of life and death are inexorable. But at night we 
enter another world in which our wishes enable us to 
travel to distant continents without so much as packing 
a suitcase or purchasing a plane ticket, in which dead 
people can return to us for visits, and undesired event 
can be willed away. 
On this view, our scientific beliefs and value entitl 
u to view with superiority people from other times and 
places. Science has replaced religion a a way of explain-
ing the world; if religion i to urvive in the modern 
world, it mu t focus on ethics, aesthetics, or p ychology 
(having nothing worth saying about the world) or b 
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The point is not to strive for objectivity in the sense of value-free inquiry, and even less 
to think of education as encouraging student s to set aside their values when they think. 
If we think of human beings as reflecting their Crea-
tor, we come to think of human beings as actors or doers, 
and in acting and doing they create. World-making is 
seen as one of our chief activities. On this view, the 
world is both given and possible; possible, that is, to be 
made and remade in different ways. When we awaken 
on a given morning, we don't leave one world and enter 
another. What confronts us is what we made the day be-
fore, and some of it is worth continuing as we project a 
future, but some of it is rubbish we should clear away 
because it isn't worth keeping and· using for the future. 
It isn't helpful, then, to think in terms of subjective vs. 
objective or reality vs. illusion or even humanities vs. 
science. It is more helpful to think in terms of making 
and creating. When the world is to be made and remade, 
we are driven to ask evaluative questions: what is worth 
discarding? what is worth retaining? what is worth pro-
jecting into the future? 
The point, then, is not to strive for objectivity in the 
sense of value-free inquiry, and even less to think of 
education as encouraging students to set aside their 
values when they think. The point is, however, to strive 
for objectivity in the sense that competing viewpoints, 
alternative hypotheses, and disconfirming data be en-
tertained and even sought. Further, rational activity 
can lead to illusions as well as models, and dreams and 
even hunches and free association can lead to models 
as well as illusions. 
Perhaps we shouldn't consider reason as the arbiter 
of claims to knowledge, or theology as a cultural over-
seer, or philosophy as keeping all the other disciplines 
honest by informing them of properly grounded and 
unproperly grounded claims to knowledge. Perhaps we 
shouldn't think of reason as a mirror reflecting the 
grime and confusions of experience, but itself a clear 
master of truth and falsity, of meaning and purpose. 
Perhaps we should think of humans as makers and crea-
tors reflecting their Creator's nature and using all their 
capacities. 
Lived experience and formal analysis go together, 
and reason is one aspect of the process. This is the start-
ing point of creative work in any area- academic or 
non-academic-although the products of the work vary 
significantly. Yet in art or science, religion or history, 
the focus is on creating. In an educational institution, 
this means something considerably more than trans-
mitting knowledge. It means creating knowledge. It 
means considerably more than the consuming of knowl-
edge; it means producZ:ng knowledge. Were transmitting 
knowledge the core of teaching and learning, a one-way 
treet would be the ideal: from teacher to student, the 
teacher giving and the student receiving. The receivers 
are asked to engage in a passive activity, but the teach-
ers are somehow beyond that, occupying like Olympians 
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a position of superiority. Here the givers are in a moral 
bind, that of asking their students to do something they 
themselves find unnecessary or refuse to do: learn. 
But if both students and teachers are engaged in the 
same process of learning, both are active in the same 
process and in the same pursuit: desiring and striving 
for what is beyond both, viz., knowledge. On this view, 
it is not so much wonder as eros which propels toward 
knowledge; it is also eros which moves us to renounce 
the superiority which comes with the assumption of 
possessing knowledge and to assert the need to search 
for knowledge. 
Clearly there is no reason to hide our ignorance as 
we engage in the search for knowledge and truth. In-
deed, our ignorance is both the starting point and the 
spur which drives us to knowledge. Nor is there any 
reason to assume that we do our work without assump-
tions. Indeed, the recognition of our assumptions lib-
erates us to attend to the tasks set before us. On this 
view, our assumptions as Christians and as scholars are 
not to be repressed or eliminated, but rather given room 
to make their operations effective. 
IV. STANDARDS FOR QUALITY 
Thesis #4: that standards of quality are derived from dis-
c,:plinary work rather than from Christianity or Christian 
theology. 
With the religious principle of Creation-Fall-Re-
demption I have tried to answer two questions. What do 
we have or what is available? Not, I suggest, ignorant 
(i.e., non-knowing) human beings who require knowl-
edge for their redemption, but created and fallen and 
redeemed beings for whom the bondage-freedom or 
servility-freedom dialectic is definitive or constitutive. 
What do we do? Not, I suggest, strive for self-actualiza-
tion or to be good members of society, but develop cer-
tain tendencies and discharge our responsibilities, and 
therein find our enjoyment and full stature as human 
beings. Not, I suggest by dividing our experience and 
world into reality and illusion and the disciplines into 
sciences and humanities, but by education toward the 
renewal of life and the remaking of the world. 
I have argued that we as learners ought to hold cer-
tain beliefs or ideas as assumptions, and that we should 
foster and develop these ideas in our learning-or that 
all learners ought to nurture the ideas and develop 
them in our studies. I have also argued that we should 
act on the basis of these assumptions or presuppositions 
-specifically as learners, we ought in disciplinary and 
interdi ciplinary activities to create, to construct ideas 
and to make theories, to create knowledge to serve the 
purpose of renewing human life and remaking the 
The Cresset 
In fundamentalist circles, a stock storehouse of rigidly held t heological views, supposedly 
derived from the Bible, determines educational standards for virtually all fields of inquiry. 
world. 
Since all ideas and acts are not of equal worth ( except 
to some liberals), and since hardly anyone would hold 
that anything goes, how would we know whether we are 
doing a mediocre, good, or excellent job? Since it makes 
little sense to hold that doing one's own thing is what 
matters, and since thinking that feeling good about 
whatever we're doing signifies poverty-stricken stand-
ards or the absence of standards, we come to ask how we 
can dispatch our responsibilities and fulfill our duties, 
and in doing so find enjoyment and render gratitude 
for our lives. In brief: by what standards do we measure 
the quality of our efforts as learners? 
A fairly common procedure is to derive standards 
for quality from Christianity or Christian theology. In 
fundamentalist circles, the enterprise is usually rather 
vulgar but straightforward. A stock storehouse of rigid-
1 y held theo~.ogical views, supposedly derived from the 
Bible, determines the conclusions that evolution is 
wrong (or "only a theory"), that Freud, Marx, and 
Shakespeare have little worthwhile to say and thus 
needn't be read, that moral inquiry is already a sign of 
moral laxity, and that scholarly investigation of Scrip-
ture is to question the answers. 
There are, in distinction, sophisticated and serious 
efforts to develop a radically different view of theology 
-theology as queen of the sciences. Here all or many of 
the disciplines are arrayed around theology as the cen-
ter, source, and goal of knowledge. Here theology is 
not one of the disciplines next to other disciplines, but 
the fundamental and foundational discipline. 
I will not argue against either of these two views-
but only say that the anti-intellectualism of fundament-
alism is incompatible with academic life and that queens 
may easily become figureheads or worse. Let me pro-
pose an alternative to both these views. 
If standards for quality or criteria for excellence are 
not to be derived from theology, where can we look? I 
suggest that we look to the disciplines: the assumption 
which found them, the procedures by which they vali-
date and invalidate hypothese , the methods by which 
re ults are obtained, the control beliefs which prompt 
acceptance or rejection or modification of theorie and 
direct the construction of new theories, and the goals 
toward which knowledge is aimed. 
It is tempting to think that it would be nice if the 
state of the di ciplines and the relations among them 
were coherent and if the students in the di ciplines con-
ducted their activities with the effortles grace and poi e 
of an Oxford don. It is tempting to think that it would 
b nice if cholars could start anew, pre uppo e littl or 
nothing, or begin afresh with only that which i elf-
e ident- and with a clear method reach true and c rtain 
conclu ions. 
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But even a glance at one's own discipline, let alone 
others' disciplines, moves one to conclude that things 
are in a state of di unity and disarray. Little unity of 
knowledge, little methodological agreement regarding 
description or explanation, little harmony regarding 
goals and uses of knowledge is apparent. This i not, 
however, the deplorable ituation we might initially 
think it to be. 
Although learning lack an ab olute starting point, 
there may b omething valuable which com s with 
construing th effort to get tarted a a dilemma. Knowl-
edge is impossible if it mean arching for what i either 
known or unknown; in the fir t ca , th r i no rea on 
to search becau e one know alr ady, and in the econd 
case, there is no po ibility of arching b cau e on 
wouldn't know what to earch for in th fir t pla . De-
grees of knowl dg , how ver, are po ibl wh n th 
dilemma of ignoranc -knowl d i r plac d with th 
continuum of opinion-know! dge, wh r k ptici m i 
never total nor certainty attainabl and b yond d ubt. 
That's the way it app ar to b in th urr nt tat of th 
di ciplin : di unity i a ign f b ing in medias res. It i 
precisely the lack f indubitable tartin point and 
fixed and c rtain c n lu ion that maintain movem nt 
in the di iplin -and mak work in at 1 a t n of 
them exciting. 
On the vi w I am urging n 
a privileg d sanctuary. Rath r th di iplin ar a -
pectual or modal that i a h di iplin ab tra t from 
the givenn of th a tual world on r an th r a p t 
for fo u ed att nti n. Th particular a p t or mod 
which b come th f u f r att ntion do n t define 
th di cipline, how v th u h n and only on 
di cipline can inquir int a parti vlar d main, fr m 
which oth r di iplin ar prohibit d fr m nt rin by 
int II ctual no-tr pa ign . W r w t think that 
of th a ual w rld a di -
ituati 
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We should expect of theories or ideas at least that their terms be coherent and consistent, 
for otherwise anomalies are generated which vitiate the explanatory power we seek. 
nents; where fundamentalisms of either the theological 
or scientific variety match swords, both sides receive 
nicks, but the audience soon goes on to more interesting 
contests. In other situations, the antagonism between 
science and theology is reduced o:r: eliminated because 
the methodological boundaries between the two ren-
der unfruitful any battle but instead invite inter-
change and conversation. 
Leaving the discussion at this point of methodologi-
cal pluralism would be equivalent to suggesting that the 
disarray is not only good but the entire story. To rush to 
another episode in the narrative may be arrogant and 
patronizing. Let me, then, tentatively suggest that there 
may be some unity not given in the beginning but dim-
1 y perceived in the process and at least projected as a 
goal or an ideal. Do we have expectations which all 
theories or ideas should meet if they are to be desig-
nated good or of high quality? Likely so. 
Certainly theories guide research and create data and 
shape observations of phenomena selected for observa-
tion. What should we expect of theories or ideas? At 
least that their terms be coherent and consistent, for 
otherwise anomalies are generated which vitiate the 
explanatory power we seek. In addition to internal con-
sistency, external fruitfulness is desirable, for we ex-
pect a theory to do something a summary or a generali-
zation doesn't do. Otherwise we satisfy ourselves with 
saying that things are complex, often taken to be a sign 
of profundity. Reduction to simplicity is a legitimate 
and necessary desideratum of a theory or an idea. 
Further, adequacy and comprehensiveness of scope 
are important features of a good idea; a theory which 
explains only part of the data or more than the data 
begs for revision. Parsimony or elegance is also char-
acteristic of a theory we call good; topics for explana-
tion must be demarked, and having too many explana-
tory terms results in a theory which tries to do every-
thing and actually does nothing except perhaps satisfy 
some psychological or mystical need. 
I haven't tried to build any theory or even theorize 
about theorizing, although that is what we in our learn-
ing should do. I have tried to suggest some criteria 
which good theories must meet in order to be called 
good, and to show that no one discipline (be it theology 
or even philosophy!) can or should lead all others or 
integrate all others. 
And through it all, I have assumed that underlying 
our academic work (as all of human life) is a perspec-
tive or a synoptic vision or a framework we together 
share, and that this standpoint can be articulated as a 
set of control beliefs which can and should guide and 
influence our academic activities of thinking and learn-
ing and creating ideas. Marxists and Freudians and 
Buddhists and Muslims and a host of others do that, 
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drawing on their deepest convictions and commit-
ments. Shouldn't we, too, strive for wisdom and insight? 
Shouldn't we, too, fulfill our responsibilities and com-
plete the thoughts that stir humans so deeply? Cl 
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The Shaping of Twentieth Century Evan-
gelicalism, 1870-1925. By George M. 
Marsden. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 306 pp. $19.95. 
Considering the tremendous im-
portance of fundamentalist religion 
in American life in both the past 
and present, it is remarkable how 
little attention it has received from 
historians, who generally delight 
in tracking down such pervasive 
cultural forces. Whether we like it 
or not, Protestant fundamentalism 
and its close ally, conservative evan-
gelicalism, have shaped the ideas, 
values, and politics of millions of 
Americans during the last century, 
yet historians know less about this 
movement than they do about the 
Greenback Party or the Townsen-
dites. If one believes that there 
should be some correlation between 
the sign ificance of an hi torical 
phenomenon and the attention 
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George Marsden's book should become required reading 
for students of American religion and culture. 
given it by historians, then funda-
mentalism presents a ripe topic 
for investigation. 
Fortunately, George Marsden's 
recent book, Fundamentalism and 
A mer£can Culture, takes a big step 
toward correcting this imbalance. 
An historian at Calvin College , 
Marsden is the first really ophis-
ticated scholar to take a close look 
at the whole fundamentali t phe-
nomenon in order to uncover it 
roots and try to understand how it 
became such a powerful pre ence 
in American life. Although it takes 
a few mis-steps and leaves plenty 
of questions unanswered Fundamen-
talism and American Culture hould 
become required reading for anyone 
who wants to understand modern 
American religion and culture. 
As he ventures into thi vir in 
intellectual territory, Mar den' 
first major task is to clarify ju t 
what fundamentalism is and to lo-
cate it historically. Although many 
people think of any kind of trict 
religiosity or moral narrowne a 
"fundamentalism," and imagin 
that it has always been around in 
some form or another, thi i not 
the case. American Prote tant 
fundamentalism is actually a p cif-
ic religious movement that aro 
around the turn of the century, and 
bears a distinct relation hip to 
American culture. Although it i a 
puzzling and terribly compl x af-
fair-at least as compl x a th 
liberal Protestanti m it opp d -
American fundamentalism po 
ses a clearly definable ori in and 
outlook that mak it u ceptibl to 
historical inve tigation and und r-
standing. 
Marsden provide a n at defini-
tion of fundamentali m. It i "mili-
tantly anti-mod mi. t Prot tant 
evangelicalism. 
were evangelical Chri tian 
to the tradition of the dominant 
American revivali t tabli hm nt 
of the ninete nth c ntury who in 
the twentieth c ntu militant! 
opposed both modernism in theology 
and the cultural changes that mo-
derni m endorsed." Fundamental-
ism wa never a church or a creed, 
but rather a movement, "in the n e 
of a d velopment or tendency in 
Christian thought that gradually 
took on it own id ntity." Although 
it eventually dev lop d a di tinct 
life, identity, and v ntually a uh-
culture of its own, fundamentali m 
n ver xi t d wholly indep nd ntly 
of the variou other mov m nt 
from which it gr wand took tr ngth. 
Fundam ntali m thu app ar d 
a om thing n win m ri an reli-
gion, but it~prang from om thing 
much old r and d p r in m rican 
xp ri nc . In th fundam ntali t ' 
powerful n of conn tion with 
th Am rican pa t , Mar d n a rt , 
Ii on of th k to th ir p cu-
liar worldvi w, th imm n impor-
tanc th y atta h d t ultural and 
moral qu tion , and th 
r e lation hip with th 
m ri an lif . 
Lik it lib ral Pr t 
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If fundamentalism was simply the defensive reaction of a dying way of life, 
then it might be explained-and written off-primarily in sociological terms. 
Looking back to a better time, they 
felt themselves to be "internal im-
migrants" in an America that was 
often as strange to them as it was to 
newcomers from abroad. Increas.-
ingl y pushed into a marginal sub-
culture outside the centers of 
intellect and power, many began to 
fight back against a modern society 
that, they believed, had turned its 
back on Christianity and lost its way: 
If fundamentalism was simply the 
defensive reaction of a dying way of 
life, then it might be explained pri-
marily in sociological terms-as 
indeed it was so understood, and 
written off, by most of its contempor-
ary opponents. Marsden does begin 
by recognizing the core of truth in 
this theory. But he persuasively 
argues that it is an inadequate in-
terpretation of the whole phenome-
non. It fails to explain the many 
genuinely new elements in funda-
mentalism, and cannot account for 
fundamentalism's persistence long 
after America ceased to be an agra-
rian/small town society. Above all 
it reckons without the powerful re-
ligious concerns that motivated the 
fundamentalists and shaped the 
character of their anti-modernist 
crusade. 
Marsden's history of the move-
ment therefore shifts attention from 
the sociological components of 
fundamentalism to its religious im-
pulses. In uncovering the major 
emphases that went to make up 
fundamentalism, Marsden in effect 
provides a religious interpretation 
of the origins and development of 
the movement. Fundamentalism's 
reaction to modern industrial soci-
ety and to particular events- espe-
cially World War I-are still seen as 
important, but they are more readily 
understood when the fundamental-
ists' novel religious outlook is 
taken into account. By focussing on 
its religious premises, Marsden is 
able to explain some otherwise baf-
fling features of fundamentalism: 
its almost schizophrenic ambiva-
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lence about America and its future, 
its curious relations with the 
churches, and its pronounced ten-
sion between "trust and distrust" 
of reason and the intellect. 
Four major religious strands were 
woven into fundamentalism. These 
were: Moodyite revivalism, pre-
millennial dispensationalism, the 
holiness movement, and orthodox 
Calvinist-primarily Presbyterian-
resistance to liberal theology, es-
pecially the new Biblical scholar-
ship. Each of these elements was to 
some extent independent of funda-
mentalism, and their differences 
often created internal tension in the 
movement, but they were united in 
their hostility to the enemy-mod-
ernism-and in their conviction 
that they had the correct religious 
answer to modern questioning. 
Moodyite revivalism is the least 
interesting source of fundamental-
ism, and therefore easy to overlook, 
but Marsden shows how Moody's 
work led to fundamentalism. Dwight 
L. Moody himself lacked a crucial 
fundamentalist quality: he disliked 
controversy and considered theology 
totally unimportant. But his im-
mensely popular style of "soul-
saving, world-denying evangelism" 
contributed in numerous ways to 
fundamentalism. Moody stood in 
the long line of great American evan-
gelistic revivalists stretching back 
through Charles G. Finney, Lyman 
Beecher, Timothy Dwight, and Jon-
athan Edwards. But unlike his il-
lustrious predecessors, Moody was 
uninterested in religious ideas and 
strongly emphasized the duty of 
Christians to turn away from "the 
fallen world." "The world is a 
wrecked vessel," he frequently pro-
claimed. "God has given me a life-
boat and said, 'Moody, save all you 
can.'" Moody retained cordial re-
lations with the leading Protestant 
liberals throughout his life, but his 
younger friends and lieutenants 
formed the elite shock troops of 
fundamentalism. 
If Moodyism represented the sim-
plest impulses of American reli-
giosity, premillennial dispensa-
tionalism was one of its more exotic 
products. Its complex, esoteric 
doctrinal notions about the dif-
ferent "ages of mankind," leading 
up to the coming apocalypse, are 
almost impenetrable to the outsider 
or novice, yet they provided much 
of the framework within which fun-
damentalists interpreted Scripture, 
history, and American culture. 
Based on a fantastic reading of the 
Books of Daniel and Revelation by 
the British Bible commentator John 
Nelson Darby ( and hence sometimes 
called "Darbyite premillennial-
ism"), dispensationalism reversed 
the usual American millennial 
optimism and became deeply pes-
simistic about "the present age" or 
dispensation, hostile to virtually 
all efforts at "human self-improve-
ment," and expectant of divine de-
livery. 
Through Darby's American dis-
ciple, D. I. Scofield, premillennial-
ism greatly affected fundamentalism 
as well as such related but indepen-
dent movements as the Jehovah's 
Witnesses. So deep was its influence 
that an earlier writer, Ernest San-
deen, virtually identified funda-
mentalism with dispensationalism. 
Marsden considers this equation 
overstated, but acknowledges that 
premillennial thought provided the 
most distinctive color to the funda-
mentalist outlook. 
One of Marsden 's greatest achieve-
ments is to offer some insight into 
the seeming I y strange dispensational 
doctrines. His most brilliant chapter 
shows the complex intellectual con-
nections between premillennial dis-
pensationalism and certain specific 
problems that had developed for 
Christian thinkers during the his-
torically-minded nineteenth cen-
tury. As Marsden notes, the ideas of 
a contest between God and Satan 
over human destiny culminating 
in an apocalypse at the end of time 
The Cresset 
If the truth of God was the same for all ages, the fundamentalists reasoned, then 
the Bible was the surest means permanently and precisely to display this truth. 
were old religious ideas. But nine-
teenth-century developments in 
economics, history, biology, and 
geology raised acute new questions 
about the nature of historical epochs 
and how change occurred. Within 
the context of their supernaturalist 
premises and gloomy cultural stance, 
the fundamentalists developed a 
consistent, self-contained scheme 
that could answer almost every 
question about history and the world. 
But in solving one set of problems, 
fundamentalism made another com-
mitment that became crucial to its 
entire outlook: belief in the literal, 
infallible truth of the Bible. As 
Marsden notes, the Bible had long 
occupied a central place in Protes-
tant piety, and was especially re-
v ere d in America where church 
authority was weak and religion 
highly personal. In its search for 
a religious authority that could 
stem the rising tide of liberalism, 
fundamentalism went one step 
further and proclaimed the abso-
lute "inerrancy" of Scripture. This 
doctrine was given its first clear 
expression in 1881 by A. A. Hodge 
and B. B. Warfield, who asserted 
that Christianity required belief 
that "the Scriptures not only con-
tain, but are the Word of God, and 
hence that all their elements and all 
their affirmation are absolutely er-
rorles and binding on the faith and 
obedience of men." 
As Marsden observes, this view of 
Biblical authority placed tremen-
dous importance on the written word 
a the guarantee of table truth 
amidst the flux of time. If the truth 
of God was the same for all ages, 
the fundamentalists rea oned, then 
the written Word of God wa the 
urest mean permanently and pre-
ci ely to display thi truth. And the 
obviou ubjectivity involved in 
accepting only ome parts of crip-
ture a true gave the doctrine of in-
errancy an appealing air of con i -
tency. But the con equence wa to 
make the Bible not impl a de-
Pn'l 1982 
finitive religious authority, but a 
repository of truth on all matter 
it mentioned. 
This view of Scripture became one 
of the most distinctive feature of 
American fundamentalism, and et 
it apart from more experientially 
or emotionally oriented form of 
folk religion such as Pentecostal-
ism. Far from being ignorant or 
anti-rational, fundamentalism wa 
in fact hyper-rationalistic, a it 
tried to counteract the puriou evi-
dence and reason of modern cien 
with the firmer truth to be found 
in the Holy Book. 
But if the methods were rational-
istic, the results were often wildly 
eccentric. In What the Bible Teaches 
(1898), the fundamentali t Biblical 
writer Reuben Torrey compil d 
more than three thou and "pr p 
sitions" conclusively proven by th 
Bible. In 1922 Moody Monthly pub-
lished an argument correlating the 
seven days of creation with th 
seven notes in the octave, r latin 
these to the even aying of Chri t 
and the seven parts of Psalm 23, and 
concluding "what need we of further 
proof that all cripture i God-
breathed?" By this time uch funda-
mentali t reading wer b ing 
mocked and satirized by H. 




caricatured them el ve . 
In a work on "Scripture numeric ," 
fundam ntalist writer Ivan Panin 
claimed to have demon trated that 
if one count up all the word and 
I tter in any giv n tion of th 
Bihl , th total arriv d at will alway 
b a multipl of ven. funda-
m ntali t ma azin pr nted thi 
work a "an unan werabl proof of 
th divine authority of th Bihl 
which no critic ha ev r dar d an-
w r. In om thing of an und r-
tatement it add d that "whil lif 
rdinary Bibi 
int th d 
tail in foll win up thi y t m h 
at d al of om-
ry and an af 1 
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By explaining the philosophical underpinning of fundamentalism, Marsden succeeds 
in making it more comprehensible. But he winds up pushing his argument too far. 
cism provided the theological fuel 
for fundamentalism, the "holiness 
movement" underlay much of its 
moral and cultural activism. The 
broad holiness revival of the late 
nineteenth century was actually ·a 
development within the Methodist 
wing of American Protestantism 
that had long stressed the necessity 
of moral improvement or perfec-
tion in the Christian believer, an~ 
it led to the creation of several new 
denominations such as the Pente-
costalists. But one faction of the 
holiness movement, particularly 
influenced by the Keswick confer-
ences in England, ended up closely 
allied with the other fundamental-
ists. With considerable doctrinal 
variation, these elements spurred 
fundamentalist social and moral 
crusades in such areas as vice, di-
vorce, poverty, sabbath-keeping, 
prohibition, gambling, and so on. 
Marsden correctly notes that many 
of these movements, such as pro-
hibition, were not conducted by fun-
damentalists alone, but were carried 
on by broader evangelical coali-
tions. But for fundamentalists they 
constituted part of a general cru-
sade against modernism, which they 
saw as the source of practically every 
social evil in contemporary America. 
Finally, fundamentalism grew out 
of the efforts of orthodox denomina-
tional scholars to prevent what they 
saw as the erosion of Christian doc-
trine by modern culture and reli-
gious Ii beralism. These fundamental-
ists often had intellectual perspec-
tives that others in the movement 
lacked and made more erious 
efforts to identify the new and 
dangerous here ies produced by the 
modern world. Exemplified on a 
scholarly plane by the Princeton 
theologians J. Gresham Machen and 
Charles Hodge, and on a more 
popular level by the twelve volumes 
of The Fundamentals pu bli hed be-
tween 1910 and 1915, these conserv-
ative Protestants mounted a 
counter-attack on the spreading 
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Protestant liberalism by showing 
how it had increasingly abandoned 
various articles of orthodox Christi-
anity. Often the major effort was 
directed to defending particular 
"miraculous" items of belief, such 
as the creation of Adam and Eve, 
the virgin birth, the descent into 
hell, and the resurrection. But as 
the intellectuals in the movement 
understood, this was partly a tactic 
to gain popular support. Their real 
target was the new worldview that, 
they contended, had entered the 
modern world with the rise of nine-
teenth-century science, and that 
threatened a contrary worldview 
based on the Bible and Scottish 
Common Sense philosophy. 
Marsden demonstrates that the 
more sophisticated fundamentalists 
were consistent adherents of a Com-
mon Sen e philosophical tradition 
that went back to the eighteenth 
century. The Common Sense 
thinkers held that the basic truths 
about nature, man, and God were 
accessible to all rational men. 
Through the application of reason 
to empirically demonstrable facts 
about the world, the eternally sure 
and valid laws of nature and nature's 
God could be discerned and applied. 
Although there might appear to be 
a considerable gap between ordinary 
experience and reason and Christian 
dogma, the Common Sen e tradition 
solved the difficulty at one stroke by 
making the Bible an equally valid 
repository of nece sary factual truth. 
As Charles Hodge stated in his vol-
ume Systematic Theology: 
If natural science be concerned with the 
facts and law of nature, theology is con-
cerned with the facts and principles of the 
Bible. If the object of the one be to arrange 
and ystematize the facts of the external 
world , and to ascertain the laws by which 
they are determined , the object of the other 
is to sy tematize the fact of the Bible, and 
ascertain the principle or general truths 
which tho e facts involve. 
Since the word of Scripture like 
nature, presented actual fact about 
the world, and not imply ubjective 
ideas subject to error, they were 
equally accessible to the rational 
human mind, which would discover 
there the eternal laws of salvation 
and morality. 
By explaining this philosophical 
underpinning of fundamentalism, 
Marsden succeeds in making it more 
comprehensible. But he goes astray 
in arguing that these writers pre-
sented an intellectually defensible 
alternative to the worldview emer-
ging from modern science and 
philosophy. In a crucial chapter 
entitled, "Fundamentalism as an 
Intellectual Phenomenon," Marsden 
brings in the theories of Thomas 
Kuhn to argue that fundamentalists 
were not really anti-intellectual or 
anti-scientific, but rather that they 
operated with a different "percep-
tual model" of the universe. The 
fundamentalists, Marsden contends, 
were operating with the Baconian 
and Newtonian paradigms that had 
dominated Western science until the 
mid-nineteenth century, when they 
were replaced by first Darwinian 
and then Einsteinian paradigms. 
Hence the fundamentalists could 
claim, legitimately, that they were 
not opposed to cience as such: 
Rather , they were judging the standards 
of the later scientific revolution by the 
standard of the first-the revolution of 
Bacon and ewton. In their view. cience 
depended on fact and demonstration. Dar-
winism, o far as they could see, was based 
on neither. The larger objection, of cour e, 
was that the evolutionary approach to the 
interpretation of biology and history took 
only natural causes into account . to the 
total exclu ion of the supernatural. 
This is an intriguing line of de-
fense, but it will not hold up. 
However valid Kuhn theory is in 
explaining cientific tran forma-
tions, it cannot buttre the funda-
mentalist position. Even by ewton's 
time, phy ical science had ad anced 
far beyond the simple 'fact-demon-
tration-law' model imagined by 
the fundamentali ts. Much of e" -
tonian phy ic for example, re ted 
on highl complex po tulate about 
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Fundamentalists were excluded from the temples of science not because they held 
to different scientific paradigms, but because they were not scientists at all. 
the nature of time and space that 
were far removed from "common 
sense." As Newton himself says in 
the Principia, "The common people 
conceive those quantities (time, 
space, place, and motion) under no 
other notions but from the relation 
they bear to sensible objects. And 
thence arise certain prejudices, for 
the removing of which it will be con-
venient to distinguish them .... " 
Even if the fundamentalists were 
as devoted to Baconian and New-
tonian science as Marsden suggests 
(and his evidence on this point is 
not convincing), this was probably 
because science until Darwin could, 
without too many intellectual gym-
nastics, be reconciled with a Scrip-
tural worldview. But with Darwin 
the gap became too great-or at 
least greater than could be bridged 
by any intellectual system as 
simple as Common Sense philoso-
phy. This was not only because the 
intellectual "paradigms" had 
changed, but because there were new 
scientific facts which were incom-
patible with fundamentalist assump-
tions. Confronted with such facts, 
the good scientist suspends judg-
ment and begins the search for 
explanations. But the fundamental-
ists instead reached for the hymnal. 
They thus more nearly resembled 
those in the Papal court who re-
fused to look through Galileo's 
telescope than they did Bacon or 
ewton. 
In explaining how the fundamen-
talists lost intellectual authority, 
Marsden comes do e to endorsing 
the fundamentalist charge that there 
was some sort of conspiracy against 
fundamentalist "scientists," and that 
Darwinian cientist were ju t as 
dogmatic" and biased as their op-
ponent . 
on-Darwinist . of cour e. were o tracized 
from cientific circle . imilarl , the modern 
theological community adopted a model for 
truth that in effect tigmatized theologian 
who rejected evolutionary view a n ith r 
cientific nor legitimate theologian . The 
Apri~ 1982 
conservatives were equally dogmatic. No 
compromise could be made with a world-
view whose proponents denied the fixed 
character of supernaturally guaranteed 
truth . Communication between the two 
sides became impossible. Fundamentalists , 
excluded from the community of modern 
theological and scientific orthodoxy , even-
tually were forced to establish their own 
community and sub-culture in which their 
own ideas of orthodoxy were pre erved . 
But such attempts to put modern 
scientists and fundamentalists on 
the same intellectual plane are 
doomed to failure. Fundamentali t 
were not excluded from the tempi 
of science because they held to dif-
ferent scientific paradigms, but b -
cause they were not scientists at all , 
and refused to accept the e ential 
premises of a scientific worldview 
in approaching nature. One can, 
perhaps, respect the courage of 
those who reject those premi es, 
but not their complaints about b ing 
shut out of the prestigious scienti-
fic enterprises. 




tion of fundamentali m's anti-Dar-
winism goes along with hi g n ral 
defense of fundamentali t a ain t 
the charge of being anti-int ll tual. 
Insofar as it refute caricatur of 
all fundamentali ts a imply mind-
iou 
little in Mar d n' a 
was anti-int lle tual in thi 
though the fundam ntali t 
m diate fo wa tw nti th-
moderni m, man of th m 
r ally to ha obj t d to an 
of qu tionin or un rtaint 
kind 
ab 
basic matters. One suspects that had 
they been there, fundamentalists 
would have walked out of Peter Abe-
lard's clas rooms in the twelfth 
century. 
Especially ignificant in this re-
gard is the fundamentalists' complete 
inability to cope not imply with 
the conclu ion but with the ba ic 
question rai ed by the n w Biblical 
criticism em rging from G rmany at 
th Whil fundamentali t 
hi h r riti i m, but that th y did 
not und r tand it, and did n t want 




Fundamentalism suffered a great defeat in the Scopes trial. But it did not, as is 
often thought, disappear. It licked its wounds and prepared to fight another day. 
found when he was invited to ad-
dress the Winona Bible Conference: 
"Practically every lecture, on what-
ever subject," he reported, "was 
begun by the singing of some of the 
popular jingles, often accompanied 
by the blowing of enormous horns 
or other weird instruments of music." 
Just as he underestimates the folk 
element in fundamentalism, Mars-
den may insufficiently stress its 
appeal as popular entertainment. 
Along with its serious work of 
saving souls, American revivalism 
had always been in the business of 
putting on a good show. Moody's 
revivals were, among other things, 
impressively staged productions, 
carefully calculated to have the pro-
per emotional effect on the audience, 
and his fundamentalist successors 
were also well-versed in the show-biz 
tricks of their trade. It was no acci-
dent that the second best-known 
fundamentalist leader of the early 
twentieth century was Billy Sunday, 
whose previous occupation had been 
that of a major league baseball player. 
The switch from the outfield to the 
revival stump may have required 
different skills, but there was no 
need to change the essential knack 
of pleasing the crowd. 
The best known fundamentalist 
leader, of course, was William Jen-
nings Bryan. A three-time presi-
dential candidate and Secretary of 
State of the United States, Bryan 
had developed a great mass follow-
ing as a politician, and American 
politicians, too, have often been as 
much in the business of entertain-
ment as of government. Bryan 
brought his gifts of oratory and 
phrasemaking from the campaign 
trail to the sawdust trail. "It is better 
to trust the Rock of Ages," he told 
delighted crowds, "than to know the 
age of rocks." Bryan's rise to leader-
ship of the fundamentalist move-
ment coincided with its increasing 
politicization after World War I, 
when, for a variety of reasons, funda-
mentalists made organized efforts 
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to gain control of major Protestant 
denominations and to translate their 
views into law, especially in the pub-
lic school systems. Playing for high 
stakes, the fundamentalists waged a 
determined battle that, in Marsden's 
judgment, fell just short of winning 
control of the mainline churches. 
But those who lived by the sword 
of publicity could also die by it. The 
Scopes trial in Dayton, Tennessee, 
in 1925 was great theater, with two 
superb performers, Bryan and Clar-
ence Darrow, playing their parts to 
perfection. But Bryan ended up as 
second banana. I have always thought 
Bryan the much more humanly 
sympathetic figure at Dayton, and 
some of his summations about the 
consequences of a purely material-
istic age were genuinely moving. 
But Darrow, cheered on by an even 
greater American publicist, H. L. 
Mencken, showed Bryan up for a fool. 
When Bryan died on the Sunday 
after the trial, Mencken's obituary 
for him was also taken by many as 
an obituary for the supposedly back-
woods phenomenon of fundamental-
ism. It was appropriate, Mencken 
observed, that Bryan had spent his 
last days in a "one-horse Tennessee 
village," because Bryan loved all 
country people, including the 
"gaping primates of the upland val-
leys. He delighted in greasy victuals 
of the farmhouse kitchen, country 
smells, and the tune of cocks crow-
ing on the dunghill." Bryan had 
made the grade of a country saint. 
"His place in Tennessee hagiography 
is secure. If the village barber saved 
any of his hair, then it is curing gall-
stones down there today." 
Fundamentalism did suffer a great 
defeat at Dayton. Its greatest popu-
lar hero had been humiliated and 
ridiculed. Within a few years fun-
damentalists had been practically 
driven out of the major northern 
denominations and destroyed as a 
political force in American life. 
But fundamentalism did not dis-
appear. Rather it licked its wounds 
and prepared to fight another day. 
As Marsden hints, and the current 
research of historian Joel Carpenter 
suggests, fundamentalists after 1925 
simply withdrew from the national 
scene in order to concentrate on 
building up strength in local con-
gregations and in informal volun-
tary alliances. Largely hidden from 
view, fundamentalists nevertheless 
retained considerable strength in 
the popular religious life of the 
country. The spectacular career of 
Billy Graham in the post-World 
War II era, for example, should 
have alerted keen observers that the 
fundamentalist-conservative evan-
gelical style of religion was by no 
means finished as a force in Ameri-
can religion and life. By the 1960s 
fundamentalists were enjoying in-
creasing wealth and confidence, and 
were ready to resume old battles 
on new ground. From the perspec-
tive of the 1980s, the neo-funda-
mentalist takeover of the Lutheran 
Church-Missouri Synod in 1969 
might be seen as a forerunner of the 
dramatic resurgence of fundamen-
talism in other areas of American 
public life. 
The recent resurgence of funda-
mentalism in political as well as 
religious life gives Marsden's book 
a timely interest not usually re-
served for historical studies. In no 
other modern Western nation did 
this particular sort of response play 
such a conspicuous and pervasive 
role in the culture, and it appears 
that role is not yet ended. Foreign 
observers, who were openly baffled 
by this feature of American life 
("Perhaps no recent event stands 
more in need of explanation," said 
one British writer about the Scopes 
trial) may be equally puzzled by cur-
rent developments. For those here 
and abroad who want to understand 
fundamentali m, a religious force 
deeply rooted in the American past 
there could be few better place to 
start than Fundamentalism and Ameri-
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At the Top 






Singing at astronomical heights 
Handeling pieces from the Messiah , 
Hallelujah , angelic choir 
The mystical divinity of unashamed felinity 
Round the cathedral sang Vivat! 
Life to the everlasting cat. 
-Cats Prologue: Jellicle Songs 
For Jellicle Cat 
I begin by letting the cat out of 
the bag. This review of Cats is written 
by a lover of cats. Not just my cats. 
All cats. If Time (December 7, 1981) 
is to be trusted, I have just manfully 
taken sides in the great cat contro-
versy raging in America between a 
growing and "prodigious number of 
Americans" who "love 'em" and the 
dogged and predictable reaction-
aries who "hate 'em." While dis-
interest is apparently possible to-
ward dogs, there eem to be very 
little middle ground concerning cats. 
If you are still reading so biased 
a review, you are at least not cate-
gorically opposed to cats. Therefore, 
I probably owe you my theological 
Richard Lee is Associate Professor of 
Humanities in Christ College of Val-
paraiso University and Director of the 
University's Overseas Study Center in 
Cambridge, England. 
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A new British musical based on T. S. Eliot's 
celebration of cats is an ailurophile's delight. 
bias too. I behold cats as catholic 
and dogs as protestant. At least 
most dogs strike me as protestant 
in temperament. That is, if a man 
wants a lot of floppy agape, a dog is 
probably best for him. Dogs are an 
open book, immediately accessible, 
denominate themselves in roving 
packs, worry about who is "top dog," 
preserve the male principle of un-
reflected action, and run liturgi-
cally free form. Canine grace is in-
discriminate and lavish, energetic 
and dutiful, and dogs are pretty 
good at taking orders, doing tricks , 
and generally observing the protes-
tant ethic of making themselve 
useful and improving upon the time. 
Dogs are probably man's best friend 
because they are closest to man a 
he is in himself. 
Cats, on the other hand, seem 
closer to God. Certainly they are 
more catholic in temperament. That 
is, if one wants to live with a my -
tery which disciplines hi ensi-
bilities to some of the depth of I if , 
a cat is perhaps best for him. Cat 
are independent and contemplative, 
perform elaborate rituals of ablution 
and oblation, pre erve th femal 
principle of the pondered life, and 
are more sensuously and fa tidi-
ously inclined to be than to do. F -
line grace is preci e and di crimin-
ate, conditional and subtl , and cat 
are more given to lives of patienc 
and perseverance than anything lik 
a barking and panting work thi 
which might require them to b up 
and doing. Dogs run to and fro , but 
cats go in and out. Dog fri k, but 
cats proces . Dog bound for you 
but cats waft around you lik in-
cense. A dog may guard your do r 
and return your to d ball , but a 
cat can keep hi eye on you in th 
dark, predict a torm in th air and 
afely land on hi paw if ou pit h 
him out for th ni ht. To Ii ith a 
cat i to live with an impa i I 
agile cont nted ompl xit whi h 
i probably a fair d ription of 
a He i in Him lf. 
II 
No theological choice is, of course, 
ultimately required between dogs and 
cats. No doubt their Creator intends 
to preserve and perfect both dogs 
and cats, not to mention protestants 
and catholics, when He brings His 
new heaven and new earth. It is, 
however, probably not for nothing 
that so deeply convert d an Anglo-
Catholic a T. . Eliot wa much 
taken by cats a pet - and a a fre-
qu nt ource of poetic metaphor . 
In one of hi arly poem he, like 
Carl andburg, likened fo to a cat 
who "rub it muzzle on th window 
pane / Licked it tongue in the 
corner of the v ning / ... mad a 
udden 1 ap / nd eing that it wa 
a oft October night / Curl d once 
mor about th hou eand f 11 a 1 ep.' 
While there ar oth r at m taphor 
in hi eriou p em th r aft r, it 
wa in hi light v r writt n m1-
tially for hi god hildr n that cat 
ame into th ir own. With tho 
po m , oll t d into Old Possum's 
Book of Practical Cats Eliot joyou 1 y 
mbra d the path ti fallacy and 
attribut c rtain human qualiti 
t a d Ii htful array f f lin har-
a t r . Ea h p r n' at i hi own 
Ror cha h ink-bl t t t, and what 
w all r ad into our cat no doubt 
m 
ab ut u than th m. 
would w ar that th 
human -
m to 
orr lative" of the 
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It is likely that Eliot, the "Old Pussum," would have been astonished- and 
delighted as well-with his eventual collaborators in the production of Cats. 
beleaguered joy of being human. 
When reading them to my own god-
children, I once wondered if there 
were any sound more fitting for 
harassed celebration than a loud 
meow. 
Cresset readers far from childhood 
may need some reminding of Eliot's 
marvelous quire of cats. There is 
that old gumbie cat, J ennyanydots, 
who sags and slumbers by day and 
then rises wearily at night to tidy 
up the whole household, even turn-
ing the kitchen cockroaches into a 
troop of "well-disciplined helpful 
boy scouts." There is Rum Tum 
Tugger, the contrary cat who re-
fuses all blandishments for his af-
fection and "only likes what he finds 
for himself"; in divine freedom he 
"will do as he will do, and there's 
no doing anything about it." There 
is Bustopher Jones, the epicurean 
cat about town who dines in alleys 
behind the best clubs in town and 
wears the weight of his prosperity 
like a bishop. There are Mungojerrie 
and Rumpleteazer, the original cat 
burglars who work their mischief 
like a vaudeville act of knockabout 
clowns and are so inseparable they 
have no identity apart from both 
their names called at once. 
There is Old Deuteronomy, so 
ancient he is well into his ninth or 
ninety-ninth life and commands the 
respect of all who venerate, if not 
age, then survival. There is Gus, the 
shabby theatre cat, now down on his 
luck but still on fire inside when he 
recalls the great roles he played un-
der the catwalks in his palmier days as 
Asparagus. There is Skimbleshanks, 
the railway cat who resolutely takes 
charge of the 11:42 Night Mail Ex-
press and patrols it relentlessly to 
see that the mail gets through. There 
is Macavity, the mystery cat who is 
always suspected but never detected 
at the scene of every crime. There is 
Mr. Mistoffeles, the conjuring cat 
who can perform astounding feats of 
prestidigitation and legerdemain, 
including producing "seven kittens 
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right out of a hat!" And, in remaining 
amphibolical order, there is Alonzo, 
Bombalurina, Carbuckety, Cas-
sandra, Coricopat, Griddlebone, 
Growltiger, Grumbuskin, Jelly-
lorum, Jemima, Munkstrap, Tanto-
mile, Tumblebrutus, and Victoria. 
For over forty years Eliot's cats 
have charmed adults of all ages, es-
pecially children, and curled up in 
their poems patiently waiting for 
a composer, director, choreographer, 
and stage designer to let them out 
of the text and into their first night 
at the theatre. 
III 
Eliot, the "Old Pussum," would 
have been astonished and, I believe, 
delighted with his eventual col-
laborators on the musical Cats. The 
notion for it started with Andrew 
Lloyd Webber, the composer of 
Evita and the rock opera Jesus Christ 
Superstar, who began making music 
for Eliot's cat poems as "a metrical 
exercise at the piano." A few of his 
songs were performed for the de-
lectation of friends in a club concert 
attended by Valerie Eliot, the poet's 
widow. She subsequently supplied 
Webber with a sheaf of unpublished 
poems and fragments of poems Eliot 
had been working on for Old Pos-
sum's Book of Practical Cats. Ultimately 
most significant was a fragment of 
"Grizabella: The Glamour Cat" 
which Eliot left unfinished because 
he could see her story might be too 
sad for children. Nearly as signifi-
cant was a reference in one of Eliot's 
letters to a possible direction for a 
"musical evening" for the poems in 
which he propo ed that the cats 
might finally go "up, up, up to the 
Heaviside Layer" -whatever that 
might mean. 
Enter Trevor Nunn distinguished 
director for the Royal Shakespeare 
Company, whose stunning produc-
tion of Dickens's Nicholas Nickleby 
is currently removed to Broadway 
(See "Doing Dickens Right" by 
Richard Maxwell in November, 
1981 Cresset) to rave reviews. The 
common labor of a director of the-
atrical and literary classics and a 
pop opera musician was apparently 
just the potent mix Cats required. 
Their fundamental problem was the 
absence of a narrative for the col-
lection of cat poems as a whole. When 
one considers all the wrong choices 
easy to make in this matter, the so-
lution Cats takes is all the more 
satisfactory. Instead of inventing 
a story and narrator-the "Old Pos-
sum" himself comes to mind, or even 
the "Man in White Spats" to whom 
the poems are dedicated-Nunn and 
Webber draw the narrative out of 
the very essence of the poems them-
selves. Almost all the cats in the 
poems are survivors in one way or 
another, and that feline capacity 
to survive is the fundamental grace 
that unifies their several separate 
stories.1 
The next step was to choose one 
of the cats as the exemplar of feline 
survival, and it wasn't far to go to 
pick Grizabella who loved much but 
not too wisely with every tom in 
town.2 By adding a few lines to 
Eliot's own "Song of the J ellicles" 
for the J ellicle cat ball, the narra-
tive is set to reveal the one exem-
plary cat Old Deuteronomy will 
choose to go "up, up, up to the 
Heaviside Layer" at the end of the 
ball. This modestly forced device 
puts just enough suspense into the 
evening, explains the gathering of 
all the cats, and brings the musical 
to its concatenations of frabjus joy 
when forlorn and tattered Griza-
1 Even Simon Bond's ailurophobic 101 Uses 
for a Dead Cat pays a certain perverted 
homage to feline survival. 
2 Grizabella sing the theme song "Memory" 
which unn adapted from Eliot's "Rhap-
sody on a Windy ight." Webber's torch 
mu ic for her lament reminds me of his "I 
Don't Know How to Love Him" for Mary 
Magdalene in Jesus Christ Superstar and 
seems to link the two characters. Elaine 
Paige's recording of" emory" now plays out 
of every pub juke box in England. 
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A second production of Cats will be opening on Broadway this autumn, and tickets 
should be ordered now, even at Broadway prices. You need not like cats to like Cats. 
bella at last is chosen. She goes 
spinning up to the "Heaviside Layer" 
(and literally out of the theatre by 
a silver stairway which drops mid-
air to meet her ascent and take her 
out through the roof) during a rois-
terous and rumbustious finale. The 
audience is left to decide what the 
"Heaviside Layer" may be-rein-
carnation, apotheosis, coronation, 
sainthood, or simply the sympathe-
tic orgasm of the universe when any 
of its creatures great or small finds 
something bright and beautiful. As 
the finale is staged, sung, and danced 
at the New London Theatre on Drury 
Lane, there is nothing left for Holly-
wood to do. 
Cats is sung and danced from be-
ginning to end, and none of the cast 
is ever offstage or often at rest. The 
overture is performed in the dark 
with (literally) thousands of cat eyes 
gleaming and winking at the audi-
ence while the dancers slip silently 
toward the stage set in the round. 
As the theatre lights come up on the 
revolving stage-an immense scrap 
heap of junked automobiles and 
spare tires, scaled outsize to make 
the dancers proportionate! y the size 
of cats-the audience is immediate-
ly plunged into total theatre. English 
music hall and Christmas panto-
mime conventions, much less the 
conventions of an American Hallow-
een masquerade of people dressed 
up in cat costumes, are left far be-
hind. Rather, Gillian Lynne, the 
choreographer, has so turned her 
dancers into cats that one suspects 
she worked witchcraft on them. Cos-
tumed in the barest suggestions of 
felinity-in a style I can only de-
scribe as sub-punk3 -the dancer 
move the audience through the 
sinuous, steal thy, and stalking 
worlds of Eliot's domestic cats by 
day and into the brawling, cater-
wauling, and reveling worlds of his 
3
The "Eurodecadent" style of the punk-de-
rived costumes gives the spectacle a ome-
what sinister aspect and help save the show 
from seeming "cute." 
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wild cats by night. 
Webber's score is not, m my 
hearing, as fresh and winsome as 
his earlier work, and some of the 
electronic organ orchestrations are 
too hurdy-gurdy, but the music is 
more than serviceable. He gives 
the dancers ample jazz, blues, swing, 
and rock tunes, as well as some 
chanties, torch songs, and pizzicato 
patter songs to explore all the move-
ments of cats that men and women 
can incarnate. Indeed, it seemed to 
me that some of the dancers may 
have had cat backbone transplants 
to pull off some of the suppler num-
bers-and perhaps claw transplants 
when they danced on the balu -
trades of the balcony. The audience 
quickly suspends disbelief as the 
cast sings and dances us into the 
lives and loves of each of Eliot' 
cats and moves up triumphantly 
to the finale of Grizabella's a cen-
sion. When Brian Blessed as Old 
Deuteronomy (American audience 
will remember Blessed as Bach in 
the Lutheran Television Produc-
tion of "The Joy of Bach") con-
cludes the performance with a ung 
declamation of Eliot's "The aming 
of Cats," the cast scat down th 
aisles to dance in the audienc and 
some of the younger memb r of 
the audience rise up to dance with 
them. Even us older member of 
At the Bread Line 
the audience were not sure whether 
the cast should be applauded or 
given caviar and cream. 
Eliot would have loved the total 
theatricality of the evening, even 
its pop sensibility, and he may fur-
ther have enjoyed the irony that 
Cats is clearly more popular than 
any of hi own weighty plays. Surely 
he knew that ometim s the world 
nd not with a bang but a whisk r. 
IV 
As thi revi w i written in early 
February, Andrew Lloyd W bber 
ha ju t accept d a W t End The-
atre Critic Award a the compo er 
of Cats. t the c remony h wa 
plea d to announc that a cond 
produ tion of Cats wa to op n on 
Broadway thi autumn, and he wa 
thu furth r honor d by th Am ri-
can invitation to bring thi En Ii h 
mu ical to th world nt r of mu i-
cal com dy. Hi mod ty i com-
m ndabl , of our , but I wond r 
if that world c nt r ha not n w 
hift d t Lond n and m ri a 
again th provin 






When d com 
he do not m al n 
h brin hi er wd, 
th p r, 
hiv rin alm 
without kin 
ach carryin 
a n w pap r bundle 
fm m ri 
quit fit. Sister Maura 
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The Limits of Power 
In Poland and El 
Salvador the Superpowers 
Face Similar Limitations 
Albert R. Trost 
If there is one concept that is cen-
tral to the discipline of political 
science it is power. Political scien-
tists are always talking about it, de-
fining it, measuring it, criticizing 
others' use of it, and using it them-
selves. Despite all of this attention 
there is still a good deal of disagree-
ment about what it is, where it is, 
and how it is used. 
Still, there would be general agree-
ment on two conceptual points. 
Power is generally understood to be 
control over the behavior of others. 
In addition, there is agreement that 
there is a difference between the 
ingredients of power, sometimes called 
capabilities, and the exercise of power. 
It is the exercise of power, an act, 
which is most directly associated 
with control of others' behavior. 
While these distinctions are second-
nature to political scientists, and 
obvious to many others not in the 
discipline, they sometimes seem to 
escape our public officials, those 
Albert R. Trost serves as Chairman of 
the Department of Political Science at 
Valparaiso University and wn·tes regu-
larly for The Cresset on public affairs. 
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There is always a considerable difference between 
the capability of power and the exercise of power. 
who are formally charged with the 
exercise of power. 
To focus on the international sys-
tem, there is some agreement among 
experts in the field of international 
relations that the size of armies, pos-
session of nuclear weapons, access to 
natural resources, industrial capac-
ity, food production, and size of 
population and land are important 
ingredients of power. There is much 
less agreement on the relative im-
portance of each of these. For in-
stance, is the possession of nuclear 
weapons more important than inde-
pendence of foreign sources of oil? 
Even harder to get agreement on are 
the so-called "intangible" ingredi-
ents of power and their importance 
in the total inventory. Included in 
the list of "intangibles" would be the 
quality of leadership and decision-
making in a society, the democratic 
or non-democratic nature of the 
regime, and public agreement on 
national goals and objectives. The 
number of ingredients on the list 
and the weight assigned to each vary 
considerably from expert to expert. 
No one doubts that the list of in-
gredients favors both the United 
States and the Soviet Union. It fa-
vors them to such an extent that they 
rate the title, "super-power." There 
is also agreement on ranking the 
capabilities of China, Japan, and 
India over Burma and Singapore, 
Brazil and Argentina over Panama 
and Ecuador, and France over Fin-
land. 
To simply compare the ingredi-
ents of power is not enough when 
attempting to explain the power 
relationships between two states. 
The stiff resistance of Finland to 
Soviet aggression in the "Winter 
War" of 1939-40 could not have been 
anticipated from comparing capa-
bilities. More recently, the match-up 
of the United States and orth Viet-
nam seemed to point strongly in the 
direction of American ability to dic-
tate terms to the other party. One 
would think that the historical les-
sons have been sufficient to warn 
any nation pretending to "great 
power" status against assuming easy 
or direct influence over seemingly 
lesser powers. Two nations that 
seem to be equating the ingredients 
of power with power itself are the 
United States as it deals with El Sal-
vador, and the Soviet Union as it 
tries to influence Poland. 
James Fallows, in an article in the 
October, 1979, issue of The Atlantic 
Monthly on American defense pol-
icy, suggests a metaphor that is help-
ful for understanding our concep-
tual problems with power. The title 
of the article was "Muscle-Bound 
Superpower." To draw the meta-
phor in more detail, the Soviet 
Union and the United States are in 
the position of a well-developed 
weight-lifter who finds himself in 
the middle of a street fight where the 
weapons are razors, bats, bricks, and 
cunning. The weight-lifter has been 
training for a competition with an-
other weight-lifter. But strength 
and well-developed muscles are of 
little use in the street fight. 
Both the US and the 
USSR face situations 
where they are, in a 
sense, "muscle-bound." -
The Soviet Union apparently 
would like Poland to adopt a more 
orthodox and deferential Marxist-
Leninist posture. It would like limits 
placed on the influence of the Soli-
darity union and the Roman Cath-
olic church. The Russians generally 
would like to see a Poland with 
fewer ties to the West. They certain-
ly would prefer a more substantial 
economic contribution from the 
Poles. These are the general goals 
and objectives of the Russians for 
Poland. So far, their impressive in-
ventory of capabilities has been in-
adequate to achieving these objec-
tives. The Russian nuclear weapon ' 
capability obviously has little appli-
cation. The capability to launch a 
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The "ripple effect" of our involvement in El Salvador can be felt in Western 
Europe, where it has a negative effect on our influence with our NATO allies. 
thorough invasion of Poland could 
also not be directly translated into 
controlling Polish behavior in the 
direction of Soviet goals. An inva-
sion would most likely put Russians, 
not Poles in charge. 
But the real inhibition on the use 
of enormous Russian capabilities to 
influence the direction of Polish 
policy is the unpredictable effect it 
would have on the Russians' ability 
to influence or control the behavior 
of others outside the Polish ruling 
circle. The unpredictable elements 
include the reaction of the Polish 
masses and the reaction of other 
European nations. In other words, 
the Soviet Union is called on to 
exercise power in a world compli-
cated by the mobilization of the 
masses (popular democracy) and the 
phenomenon of the interdepend-
ence of nations. Governments can 
no longer be isolated in most coun-
tries from their population for pur-
poses of directly applying pressure. 
Nor can nations be isolated as easily 
from other nations in a selective 
application of force. 
The Russians not only have to be 
concerned about the consequences 
of their exercise of power for the 
behavior of the Polish ruling elite, 
but for the behavior of the Polish 
masses as well. They have to be con-
cerned not only with the reaction of 
the Reagan administration to their 
exercise of power, but of govern-
ments and populations in Europe. 
What may seem like a gain in the 
policy of Polish rulers through the 
application of martial law or the 
threat of an invasion may set back 
the neutralist, anti- A TO tide that 
is running in some of the nations of 
Western Europe. The Soviet Union 
has to be concerned that in winning 
more control in Poland it does not 
lose influence with neutralist groups 
in Holland and We t Germany that 
are putting pressure on their govern-
ments not to go along with Presi-
dent Reagan's nuclear arms plan 
for We tern Europe. Even more crit-
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ical, the exercise of Soviet power in 
Poland through martial law or in-
vasion may mobilize large sectors 
of the Polish population to oppose 
Russian control. 
From the restraint it has shown so 
far in Poland, the Soviet Union 
probably understands better than 
the Reagan Administration the pit-
falls in assuming that "super-power" 
status and capabilities are the ame 
as super power. 
American failure to 
comprehend the concept 
of power seems clear in 
the El Salvador affair. 
American failure to comprehend 
the concept of power seem cleare t 
in our present involvement in El 
Salvador. Our objectives in that 
country now appear to be upport 
of the Duarte-led junta in its fight 
with the insurgents, a pref er nee 
for an elected, civilian governm nt 
of the center or center/right, and a 
clear signal to Cuba and the ovi t 
Union that we will not tolerate th ir 
subversion of government in C n-
tral America. Although ther may 
be legitimate opposition to th 
objectives, once they are a um d 
the temptation is to u e our tr m n-
dous advantage in capabilitie in th 
Central American region (weap n 
technology, capital, etc.) in ord rt 
try to achieve the obj ctiv . in 
El Salvador is where the imm diat 
action is, it i easy to a um that it 
should be the target of our ex r 1 
of power. 
There i little doubt that ur apa-
bilitie are overwh lming wh n on 
contemplate th ir application to 1 
Salvador. They ar asily uffi i nt 
to def eat the immediat in ur n 
in that country. How v r on id r-
able caution i called for in i latin 
who and what w are tryin t 
trol and in b ing awar of th 
ple effect' of our action . 
Pre id nt R agan and 
of tate Haig hav mad man 
r ta 
tat -
ments which would indicate that 
they think Cuba and Russia are di-
rectly behind the insurgency. If this 
is so, how much does the use of our 
capabilities in El Salvador work to 
control Cu ban and Russian be-
havior? With regard to the target 
for our exerci e of power, it i po -
sible that a rising tid of expecta-
tion and fru tration among the 
poor in El alvador ( and perhaps 
Bondura and icaragua) are the 
major r a on for th in tability and 
in urgen y. P rhap w are apply-
ing th wrong ingr di nt of pow r. 
A much a r a on for u ing cau-
tion in d aling with El alvador a 
getting cl ar who w ar trying to 
control i th interd p ndenc b -
tw n our influ n th r and our 
pow r in oth r part of th r ion 
and th world. W n d to b cl ar 
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End of Play 
Two Recent Plays Remind 
Us of the Importance of 
Ending Things Right 
John Steven Paul 
There is something about the end 
of a play that engages the critical 
intelligence of nearly every specta-
tor in a theatre. In my experience, 
directors are typically concerned 
with the beginning of a play; play-
wrights with the middle; but audi-
ences are always most concerned 
with the end. "I didn't care for the 
ending." "Life's full of misery. When 
I come to a play, I want to see a hap-
py ending." "The play was great 
until the end-it seemed tacked on." 
"The ending was false. Life isn't 
like that." Lobbies and parking lots 
ring with judgments about the end 
of a play. 
Certain critics and historians of 
drama have identified form and his-
torical period according to the way 
groups of plays end. "Modern Euro-
pean Pessimism" became a generic 
term during the latter years of the 
nineteenth century, because plays 
by leading dramatists-Ibsen, 
Strindberg, Hauptmann, and Zola-
usually ended in distinctly unhap-
py fashion. The French critic Fer-
John Steven Paul, who is a stage di-
rector and teacher of dramatic literature 
at Valparaiso University, is The Cres-
set's regular theatre critic. 
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Of all those involved in theatre, audiences care 
most about a play coming to a satisfactory end. 
dinand Brunetiere distinguished 
the major dramatic genres according 
to the resolution of conflict; that 
is, by the ways in which plays ended. 
Aristotle's provocatively brief 
commentary on Tragic poetry 
opened the discussion of endings . 
Tragedy is, we read in the Poetics, 
an imitation of an action which has, 
among other features, a beginning, 
a middle, and an end. The end has 
especial significance, for it is linked 
to the elicitation of catharsis in the 
audience. The meaning of catharsis 
has been much disputed, but it has 
to do with the emotional release of 
the audience from the cell of terror 
and pity in which it has been im-
prisoned while viewing the play. 
Whatever else may be said about 
catharsis, it surely cannot be present 
until the play has ended. 
The twentieth-century aestheti-
cian and critic Susanne Langer 
submits that the play's end is of the 
essence of dramatic form. What 
Langer terms the "dramatic illu-
sion" is equivalent to suspended 
form. "In a play, form is not valu-
able and cannot be valuable in itself, 
because until the play is over form 
does not exist. Only the suspense 
of form has value."1 There is no 
dramatic form, then, until the end 
of the play. Drama, Langer writes 
elsewhere, is the poetic mode of 
destiny; it is action driving inexor-
ably toward an end. 
••••• 
Two recent productions illustrate 
the essential nature of the end in 
dramatic form and the importance 
of the end to a satisfying theatre 
experience. Grownups, a new play 
by Jules Feiffer, opened in New York 
last fall. Its popular success ( at this 
writing the play is still running) is 
probably due to the playwright's 
excellent ear for language and his 
1 Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form ( ew 
York : Scribner's , 1953 ), p. 309 . 
skill in setting the language down. 
The play is a delight to hear ; the 
dialogue dances with sophistication 
and a lilting rhythm that becomes 
more choreographically complex 
as each character joins the verbal 
interplay. 
The people in Jules 
Feiffer's recent play 
Grownups are like us-
painfully like us. 
Feiffer's subject has perennial 
appeal for American audiences: 
Grownups is a family play. And, 
though this family is situated in a 
specific geographical, socio-econom-
ic, and ethnic context, the people 
are like us-painfully like us. There 
are three generations here, repre-
sented by a mother and father, their 
grownup daughter, son, and his wife, 
and the son's daughter. Fueling the 
plot are the family members' un-
realistic expectations of one another 
and their unspoken resentment of 
one another which together feed an 
ample reservoir of guilt. The plot 
proceeds like a game in which char-
acters move through a series of con-
frontations, exchanges of indirect 
accusations, and reciprocal resent-
ment. The more guilty feelings they 
can generate in one another, the 
further they move toward a kind of 
personal, though Pyrrhic, victory. 
Well-armed with a sense of their 
opponent's vulnerabilities and 
highly-skilled from practice, these 
blood relations play for blood. 
The confrontation between the 
son, Jake, and his father, Jack, typi-
fies the series of duels that make 
up the play. Jack has spent his life 
working hard, investing time, 
money, and hope in his son's suc-
cess. Jake has become a success by 
any standard. He is comfortably af-
fluent, married, and the father of a 
beautiful child. Jake is a writer for 
the New York Times and he is about 
to have his first book published 
bearing a book-jacket endorsement 
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Michael Weller's 1979 drama Loose Ends is not as gracefully or forcefully written 
as Grownups, but it finally provides a more satisfying theatre experience. 
by David Halberstam. For Jack and 
his wife Helen, writing for the Times 
is a certification of success; a printed 
endorsement from Halberstam is an 
undreamed-of benison from above. 
Still, the father constantly wonders 
"What's new?" in his son's life, 
what else he's accomplished. Jack 
scores extra guilt points by reminding 
Jake often that he rarely gets to see 
his granddaughter: "What's new-
where's my granddaughter? What's 
new-where's my granddaughter?" 
the resentful Jake barks in mocking 
imitation of his father. 
What works for father works for 
son, and daughter, and daughter-in-
law, and even granddaughter. Jake 
tells his sister Marilyn that she does 
their parents no good by indulging 
them; Marilyn responds that Jake 
does them no good by ignoring them. 
Jake pinpoints his wife Louise's 
failure to answer their daughter's 
every cry for aid as a basic flaw in 
their family life. Further, Jake tells 
Louise that it is her inability to 
enter into serious discussions calmly 
that stands in the way of overcoming 
family difficulties. Louise rejoins 
that Jake undercuts her disciplinary 
strategies toward Edie and fails to 
empathize with her situation as wo-
man, wife, and mother. The little 
girl predicts personal disaster if 
her father doesn't help her with her 
homework and she shames her par-
ents for bickering at home. Each of 
these accusers implies that the 
family's life would be perfect were 
it not for faults and thoughtlessness 
of the person being accused. 
The middle of the play comprises 
the gradual development of a laby-
rynthine network of guilt and re-
sentment transactions. This 
development is accompanied by an 
upward-spiraling of tension. Feiffer 
continues the spiraling in Act III. 
Jack and Helen come to visit Jake 
and Louise, escorted by their daugh-
ter Marilyn. For the fir t time in 
the play all the characters will be 
in immediate proximity to one an-
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other. This confrontation has all 
the aspects of a scene oblige, a con-
clusive battle which will bring the 
drama to an end. 
Grownups fails because a 
play is not a comic 
strip: a punch line will 
not serve as an end line. 
"What's new-where's my grand-
daughter," Jack chants. Edie run 
from him in childish revul ion. 
Helen presents Edie with a book, a 
copy of which the child already own . 
The little girl's inconsiderate pro-
clamation of the fact leads to round-
about sparring on all sorts of i u 
both related and unrelated to the 
present: how to graciously accept 
a gift, gratitude, respect for other ' 
feelings, manners, right to priva y 
in the home, deference, and whether 
or not failing to return books to a 
lending library is an immoral act. 
The scene begins to boil until Jake, 
unable to bear up any longer, cli-
macticall y declares that he and 
Louise have decided to separate and , 
in a final masterstroke, that th un-
happiness of his entire life mu t b 
blamed on his parent and th ir 
treatment of him a a child . e 
sense an imminent ending now. But , 
like other attack in the play, Jak ' 
hysterical thru t i parried by the 
competing claims of oth r who p r-
cei ve themselve a the injur cl 
parties. Jake's intended p roration 
become only another accu ati n. 
Yet the play mu t end, or at l a t 
stop, for it has run it cour . Edi 
asks her father th rea on for hi 
ranting and ravin . J ak lo k at 
her helple s in hi fru trati n 
and ay , "Edie, I'v quit th Times!' 
E DOFPLAY. 
The play ends in medias res. 
feel cheated. B trayed. Fr m 
beginning, thi drama wa 
with a en e of d tiny: a 
ling if not ominou 
thi action wa l adin m \ h r 
It doe n 't. On w nd r : p rha 
Feiffer intended the New York Times 
to be a symbol of the entirety of 
Jake's pre ent xi tence. When he 
quits hi job, hi exi tence comes 
to an end. If that was the play-
wright's int ntion, it doe n't work 
on tag . The ymboli mi not trong 
enough to bring a en e of do ure 
to th plot. Th structure of Grown-
ups i lik that of on of Feiffer' 
comic trip . Thr frame of build-
up and a final £ram for a punch 
lin . "Edi ,I'v quitth Times."What 
uc eed in th comic , fail in the 
th atr : a pun h lin will not rv 
for an nd lin 
••••• 




Art is a structured imitation of life, not an 
exact copy-a rendering of life, not a video tape. 
innocence of the sixties is destined 
to be ravaged by the reality of adult-
hood in the seventies. 
Paul and Susan part in Bali, but 
they meet up again in the States. Paul 
introduces Susan to some of his 
friends in the Boston area. The two 
decide to set up housekeeping, 
though without the sanction of mar-
riage. They begin to make a spare 
living in independent careers-he 
in film editing, she in photography. 
Their lives and relationship change. 
They marry. Susan is the first to 
commit herself to steady work as a 
photographer and to begin to make 
concessions to the demands of her 
high-powered profession. Paul's 
film-editing business becomes in-
creasingly successful. In the middle 
years of their marriage, they find 
that together the demands on their 
time and their own growth are 
driving a wedge between them. Paul 
wants a baby, Susan isn't sure. Paul's 
career takes him to Los Angeles; 
Susan's takes her to New York City. 
Susan becomes pregnant. Without 
telling Paul, she aborts the fetus. 
They separate. Paul remains in Bos-
ton. Susan moves to New York. 
Real life is textured 
and tainted with matters 
unfinished, lingering 
from and belonging to 
all our times past. 
Afterthreemonths,Paul and Susan 
reunite in New York. Now, however, 
there are many loose ends to be tied. 
They move on. People they meet 
become people they once knew. They 
prosper in their professions. They 
make money and with it they buy 
things, including the supreme sym-
bol of American materialism, a 
Weber grill. Of the several loose 
ends that dangle untied, it is the 
issue of the child that trips them 
up. Paul learns of Susan's abortion 
from a friend. His pain strips him of 
his reason and his memory of the 
good times the two had enjoyed to-
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gether. The play reaches a searing 
climax as Paul's pain erupts from 
him like madness and he shouts his 
tragic recognition of the emptiness 
of their relationship. The scene ends 
with Susan's decision to call a law-
yer, but the play has not ended. 
It has been the pattern of the 
action that a matter of unfinished 
business has lingered after one 
scene and has appeared in another. 
In the final scene, Weller ties up 
the loose ends. Paul, now divorced 
from Susan, is visiting her in the 
cottage where they were married. 
They reminisce about old times. 
A new reality intrudes upon their 
dreamy remembering. Jerry, Susan's 
boyfriend, is waiting out in the 
car. Paul asks when they'll see one 
another again, anticipating a week-
end of lovemaking. "I don't think 
we'd better do this again," Susan 
replies. Car noise: it's Jerry. Susan 
gathers her things to leave, but be-
fore going outside, she turns to Paul. 
"Bye, babe," she says. "Bye," he re-
turns. (They hug.) END OF PLAY . 
Paul and Susan are at an end. 
There are no more chances, no more 
loose ends to be tied up. The ex-
changed words, "bye," have confer-
red an end upon the action and with 
that end comes release for the audi-
ence. 
It is true that in life there are few 
absolute endings - few clean, con-
clusive, final statements that mark 
the close of one segment of experi-
ence and clean the slate for the next. 
Real life is textured and tainted 
with matters unfinished lingering 
from and belonging to times past. 
Still, art at its best is a tructured 
imitation of life, not an exact copy-
a rendering of life, not a video tape. 
This is the source of art's seductive 
appeal for us; art is not like looking 
at life through a window but through 
a lens. Art intensifies, clarifies, and 
interprets life experience partly 
by structuring; that is, by imposing 
upon experience a beginning, a mid-




Keeping the Faith 
A Guide to the Christian Message. By 
David G. Truemper and Frederick A. 
Niedner, Jr. Philadelphia: Fortress Press. 
144 pp. $5.95 (paper). 
The editor of this journal knew 
what he was in for. Asking as he did 
a doting teacher to review a book by 
two former, favorite students is 
bound to produce something in-
cestuous. And I, having now been 
presented with that temptation, 
could hardly be expected to forego it. 
So, yes , I do admit to being pleased 
and only a little embarrassed that 
years of old classroom secrets, in-
cluding puns and cliches, have now 
surfaced in such a public medium 
as this theological manual for a new 
generation. But I hasten to add that 
these intergenerational borrowings 
are not as numerous as rumored 
and that where they do occur they 
probably do so with better grace 
than at their first appearings. 
Naturally it is reassuring to learn 
that today's undergraduates will 
still be reading: that essentially "the 
Bible is problem-solving literature," 
that its God is the decisive "evalu-
ator," that his "criticism" or "diag-
nosis" is consistently "far worse" 
than we prefer, reflecting "the law's 
double bind" ("Damned-if-you-do-
and-damned-if-you-don't") and a 
justice which is "merely fair"; also 
that his justice is "trumped" by his 
mercy in Jesus Christ, whose apt-
est title is "the friend of sinners " 
who "became Lord by becoming . . . 
the 'curse' for us," nece sitating his 
cross and only therefore his resur-
rection; al o that his "promises can 
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be received only by trusting them," 
faith being "the one means of setting 
into effect the reality that is prom-
ised"; also that the foremost task 
of Christian theology is "keeping 
the Good News good," and doing so 
by means of "the double test for doc-
trine: make maximum use of the 
crucified Christ, and provide com-
fort and consolation to troubled 
sinners." 
If many of the above themes, 
even some of the theological quips, 
sound hauntingly familiar, that 
could be because they come not just 
from a single seminary's pedagogi-
cal tradition but also from a do-
main as public as the Gospel of Mat-
thew, Paul's Romans and Galatians, 
the Nicene Creed, Luther's cate-
chisms, the Augsburg Confession, 
and here and there even a bit of 
Whitehead, Aquinas, and Marx. 
On the other hand, if I were asked 
to guess what the more immediate 
influence has been which accounts 
for this book's excellence, I would 
point to the "private, self-con-
sciously Christian university" at 
which Truemper and Niedner teach 
and to which they refer in the book's 
introduction. I happen to know 
enough about that fascinating com-
munity, both inside and outside its 
department of theology, to recog-
nize its salutary effects upon these 
two authors. Item: the very literate-
ness of the book reflects a Valparaiso 
tradition of Christian urbanity, 
wording the Word with a care for 
its humor no less than its holiness. 
Item: an acknowledgment of alter-
native theological traditions impels 
the authors not to apologize for 
their own tradition as one arbi-
trary choice among others (that 
would be chicken) but, with truly 
collegial pluralism, to accept public 
responsibility for arguing their 
case as reasonably as they can. Item: 
even the semi-popular level of this 
'catechism" does not tempt the 
authors to settle for cheap, prema-
ture certitudes, but what is histor-
ically iffy, also in scripture, is freely 
and scientifically admitted. Item: 
in a booklet on doctrine, a very brief 
one at that, it is gratifying to find 
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as much of the university's ethical 
concern for the world as there is, 
and not only in the chapter on "Jus-
tice and Mercy." Item: the priority 
of the sacraments and sound preach-
ing in Valparaiso's liturgical tra-
dition is everywhere in the book, 
unabashedly pastoral yet never 
clerical or elitist. 
After all is said about this book's 
ancestries- remembering that books 
on Christian doctrine have no busi-
ness being too original - this one 
does show, in appropriate way , also 
delightful originality. Two of my 
favorite sections, for sheer freshness 
of insight, are the three-page thriller 
on our Lord's "descent to the dead" 
and chapter eight-a sure candidate 
for a devotional classic-on "the 
'Abba' prayer." Watch for the quot-
ables in these sections to reappear 
in the habitual language of Niedner's 
and Truemper's students, among 
whom I now count myself. 
The book's brevity n ce aril 
leaves plenty of unanswered que -
tions, which should make it a boon 
for classroom discussion. For in-
stance, "Should a Christian ev r 
rebel against parents or govern-
ments who have become unjust or 
unloving?" a question which is pos d 
but not answered , at least notice-
ably. Or, the Fifth Petition of the 
Lord's Prayer: doesn't it sound "a 
if one is asking to be forgiven only 
to the extent that one can or will 
forgive those who have harmed or 
offended oneself"? Sure, but what 
is the answer? It i n't only i it, 
that what we are really praying i 
"Father, make us forgiver aft r 
your own heart"? Really, a th 
Large Catechism remind u , we do 
forgive one another, ma b not 
from the heart but till with G d' 
very forgiveness. What el are w 
doing in the Euchari t wh n w 
change The Peace? 
There are other urg nt qu 
which are not rai ed in o man 
words but almo t are. Grant d it i 
e ential that the acram nt w r 
in tituted by the hi torical J e u 
but then mu t not their dominical 
in titution be om how rifiabl 
hi torically? Or, ince on f th 
distinctions of this book is its luxu-
rious use of scripture, notably the 
Old Testament, all the more reason 
to ask, by what right do we non-Jews 
read the sacred literature of another 
people as if it were ours, all the while 
calling it "old" -and then answer 
that que tion. Or, the dogged que -
tion of universalism: "if sinner do 
not hear or listen to that word [of 
forgivene s], . . . they go unfor-
given, at lea t to all appearance ." 
What does that mean, profe or, 
"to all appearance "? It take a good 
a book a thi to evoke uch tough 
que tion . 
Frequ ntly r qu t om for a 
hort, r adabl , up-to-dat intro-
duction to hri tian doctrin . I now 
know ju t the m to r omm nd. 
Cl Robert W. Bertram 
Ecotopia Emerging 
By Ernest Callenbach. Berkeley: Banyan 
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prised at an ecologically-based al-
ternative vision, living as we do in 
the world of Three Mile Island, 
Agent Orange, Love Canal, PCB, 
and acid rain. 
Ecotopia Emerging is 
an entertaining yet 
serious book, and it 
focuses on a key issue. 
Now Callenbach has written about 
Ecotopia emerging, the historical 
process by which Ecotopia was cre-
ated in the 1980s and 1990s. In · a 
sense, this is a more dynamic and 
novelistic story than Ecotopia itself, 
since it deals with the political and 
social conflict that brings out the 
secession and successful creation of 
the new state. The tale involves a 
variety of characters, all of whom 
play a role in political change: a 
precocious teenager who builds a 
cheap photovoltaic battery for solar 
power generation, thus permitting 
people to unhook from the power 
company; leaders of the Survival-
ist Party (mostly women), who ar-
ticulate the political and ecological 
stance of the movement; corporate 
executives and politicians, who op-
pose and fear the movement; Cancer 
Commandoes, people dying of can-
cer who blow up chemical plants; 
and so on. 
The plot centers on the increasing 
refusal of Pacific Northwestern 
people to accept the environmental 
risks demanded of them. In acts of 
almost frontier defiance to central-
ized authority, they withdraw not 
only their support for high-tech, 
but also their allegiance to the 
United States. The U.S., bogged 
down in conflicts in Brazil and Saudi 
Arabia, desperate to keep the high-
tech economic system of the East 
and Sunbelt going, and hamstrung 
by bigness, finally acquiesces in 
the secession. 
While the Ecotopians restore some 
human-scale sanity and respect for 
nature in their peaceable kingdom 
in the Pacific Northwest, the Ameri-
cans experience inertia, decay, and 
the desperate entanglements of their 
economic and political empire-
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widespread poisoning by chemical 
and nuclear accidents, ever-in-
creasing military expenditures, the 
brink of war over threatened oil sup-
plies, inflationary spirals, contam-
inated food and water supplies, 
government repression accompa-
nied by sporadic uprisings in blight-
ed and poor cities, and a bankruptcy 
of traditional economic and poli-
tical panaceas. The book ends with 
Ecotopia emergent as a green beacon 
in a world committing ecological 
suicide. 
Ecotopia Emerging is an enter-
taining yet serious book, and it 
sketches what may be the central 
social issue of our immediate future: 
the relationship of American society 
to nature. This futurist fantasy 
speaks to the question of how we 
live and how we should live. It re-
cognizes that we are badly split, and 
will continue to be, over what it is 
that we want and what we are willing 
to sacrifice to get it. The social and 
political polarization in the 1980s 
will likely be along the usual class 
and party lines, to be sure, but at 
the core is likely to be the issue of 
what we can and should do to our 
environment. 
Indeed, this novel suggests that 
the evil done to nature will be re-
turned in kind; a horror movie 
could retitle the book, "The Re-
venge of Nature." Those that destroy 
Nature are destroyed for their de-
struction. The gigantic consumptive 
machine of advanced industrial 
society, insatiable in its gluttony 
for more, is destroyed by the nat-
ural catastrophes it brings to feed 
its ever-expanding appetite. Those 
who possess reverence for Nature-
a form of cosmic piety- and create 
a kind of retribalized Rousseauan 
Gemeinschaft in the Northwest 
are blessed by Nature. 
Our attitude toward Nature has 
always had an element of schizo-
phrenia to it. On the one hand, the 
logic of capitalism and empire-
building demanded the domination 
and use of Nature. But on the other 
hand, we were the heirs of the Gar-
den of the World, and it was our 
responsibility to preserve it and be 
part of it. This has always been a 
theme in Jeffersonian democracy 
(and indeed, the altruistic teenager, 
when she visits Washington, goes to 
the Jefferson memorial, and notes 
that the marble statue is being eaten 
away by acid rain), in our fascina-
tion with the spectacular scenery of 
America, in the conservation move-
ment that created the national parks, 
in the "back to nature" movements, 
and in the contemporary environ-
mental movement. And as Callen-
bach understands, there is a reli-
gious root to this vision: one should 
not despoil Eden. In any case, as 
Leo Marx has discussed, we cannot 
make up our mind about the place 
of "the machine in the garden." 
One may draw many messages 
from such a rich, provocative, and 
perhaps even prophetic book. On 
the first page, the author conjures 
up the image of Rome and notes 
that "many such great centers of 
civilization arose and flourished and 
then collapsed-in a majestic cycle 
almost as imposing as the earth's 
own seasonal rhythms." Perhaps 
what Callenbach portrays is the de-
volution of empire. Historians since 
Thucydides have told us of the bur-
dens and corruptions of empire, and 
how eventually they cannot meet the 
challenges that face them. They grow 
gigantic and cumbersome and aged, 
unable to control the entropic 
forces they had previously brought 
under their command. They stumble 
from crisis to crisis, unable to under-
stand or control the world they once 
dominated. For whatever the mix 
of reasons, the historical finger 
writes, and having writ, moves on. 
We could be witnesses 
in America to a new 
version of an old theme: 
the decline of empire. 
So it may be with contemporary 
America. If history is the rivalry 
and succession of empires, the rise 
and fall of imperial orders, then we 
may simply be witnessing a new ver-
sion of a very old theme: the devo-
lution, the "waning," of the Ameri-
can Empire. The felt imperatives 
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of empire-economic and political 
power exercised to keep the empire 
going- become demonic and indeed 
self-defeating. One senses in this 
book what is lurking out there- the 
idea that government is remote and 
uncaring, that institutions are in-
human and inflexible, that the 
established order is corrupt and ar-
rogant, that decadence and decay 
pervade society, that we are unable 
or unwilling to solve our problems, 
including the fundamental peace 
with Nature. The entropy of power 
stems from entropy of will, and ri-
val and more vigorous powers take 
matters into their own hands. So too 
do ordinary people. 
If the American political, indus-
trial, and military establishment are 
the Romans of this tale, the Surviv-
alists are the Christians. Like the 
Christians of old, they have to learn 
new survival skills to survive in a 
disintegrating society bent on its 
own destruction. The pragmatics 
of the system become demonic in-
stead: the system either will not or 
cannot stop its commitment to power 
and growth, but that demonic com-
mitment becomes all the more 
destructive. It should be expected 
in such periods of devolution that 
people will take their lives into 
their own hands too. If the Surviv-
alists are the Christians, then inner-
city street gangs will be the vigorous 
barbarians who will sack the temples 
and palaces. 
Such speculative interpretation 
is a melancholy view of contempo-
rary history, but one that reminds us 
of the finiteness of our worlds- na-
tural, imperial, historical. It also 
reminds us that the quest for power 
is not the same as the quest for hap-
piness, so we shouldn't be surprised 
when popular movements occur 
which seek happiness at the expense 
of power. There is no reason for us 
to expect that we should be any more 
exempt from the historical logic of 
empire than the Athenians, Romans, 
or British. Nor should we be sur-
pri ed that when empire submerges, 
other forms of life-other empires-
hould emerge. Perhaps Callenbach 
hould now write a third volume on 
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the decline and fall of the Ecoto-
pian empire, since it too will not 
defeat the ultimate empire, the Em-
pire of Time. 
of a hopeless future of chaos and 
ruin, or Orwell's enduring image 
of an equally hopeless future of con-
trol and slavery. The idea that we 
might escape both chaos and control, 
and create a world like Ecotopia, is 
as yet only an idea, but one may cer-
tainly hope that it is an idea whose 
time has arrived. 
Yet the Ecotopians seem a benevo-
lent and rational alternative. Cer-
tainly Callenbach's version of the 
future is one of the few hopeful 
ones at the moment. Compare the 
humane world of Ecotopia with 
Robert Heilbroner's bleak vision ti James Combs 
Foxes 
If the light had not been citron color, illuminin 
to glass 
translucency; if a pastoral breeze had not lift d 
the grass 
like spindrift to my feet, I might n ver have topp d 
nor stood, 
silent in the sunny wood. 
The vixen came first, out of the bra k n-r f d 
dried-out runnel, 
her pointed snout lifted from th darkn 
of the tunnel; 
four little foxes, half-blind in th unny, n n-day 
air 
followed snuffling from the lair. 
Half a square from the hou , half a quar fr m 
the street, 
no twig cracked, no leaf unfold d. Th fo ·t d, 
braced feet 
lifting her body, triangular ar al rt. Th hr cl 
floundered to play 
like puppies in a hop di play. 
The short, sharp bark in th night-, h rd 
it often then, 
and we saw them in th umm r qui t n ar 
the hidden den; 
never domestic, but law-abidin r mind r that 
Adam gave nam 
to beast and bird, love-worth , tam . 
Greyhound bu or truck on th hi h" a " ul ha 
caught them oon 
had it not b en th rifl hot in a ni ht 
more quiet than noon. 
If the Son of Man had n t wh r n t la hi h ad 
no hut, nor holl w 










1111 Ill 1111 
1111 ......... 
111111 111111111111111 
1111111• 1111 1111 
Of Ringstraked Cattle 
And Dead Seed 
John Strietelmeier 
One of our departmental majors 
from the 1950s, when I was still 
teaching a course in historical geol-
ogy, writes from her home in the 
Southwest. She is still troubled by 
the apparent contradictions between 
the Scriptural record and the geol-
ogist's reconstruction of earth 
history. She wants to know whether 
I have given the matter any further 
thought. 
Actually, to be frank about it, I 
have not. I am very much aware of 
the difficulties of mind and con-
science which many of my students 
over the years have experienced as 
they tried to bring their theology 
and their science into line with each 
other. For more than a decade it was 
not only my duty but my very spe-
cial privilege to give them whatever 
help I could in their struggle. 
I always felt, though, that I could 
be of only very limited help to any-
one engaged in this struggle, for I 
had never been through it myself. 
My earliest theological training, in 
parochial school, was thoroughly 
fundamentalist. But as a compulsive 
reader in a house which contained 
few books, I had gotten hooked on 
the King James Version of the Scrip-
tures and in that marvelous book I 
had read all manner of quaint and 
curious things, some of which of-
fended my sense of propriety, and 
some of which contradicted my ex-
perience of reality. So, in effect, all 
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the while I was being fed a poten-
tially lethal diet of fundamentalism, 
I was sneaking the powerful antidote 
of the Scriptures, taken straight. 
Thus, for instance, when I ulti-
mately encountered the theory of 
organic evolution, it seemed no 
more inconsistent with the Faith 
than the biology of Genesis 30:37-39, 
where that admirable rascal, Jacob, 
had taken him rods of green poplar 
and of the hazel and chesnut tree 
and piled white strakes upon them 
and set them before the flocks in the 
gutters of the watering troughs 
when the flocks came to drink that 
they should conceive when they 
came to drink. By this stratagem, 
you may remember, Jacob was able 
to selectively breed ringstraked, 
speckled, and spotted animals 
which, under an agreement with his 
uncle Laban, he was entitled to keep 
for himself. 
Nor do I recall being upset on 
first encountering our Blessed Lord's 
own mistaken assertion that "except 
a corn of wheat fall into the ground 
and die, it abideth alone: but if it 
die, it bringeth forth much fruit." I 
don't think that I have ever believed 
that seeds are planted so that they 
can die and I doubt that any of the 
prosperous old farmers in St. Peter's 
congregation believed that either. 
But neither have I ever, so far as I 
can remember, thought that it was a 
sin to be mistaken. 
I owe a great deal to fundamen-
talism, especially two things: first, 
the awareness that every serious 
question has an inescapable theo-
logical dimension and, second, the 
enriching and enlarging experience 
of growing up in the Scriptures. I 
suppose that it may be the very size 
of this debt that makes me so im-
patient with fundamentalists, so an-
noyed with what strikes me as their 
insistence upon trivializing the very 
treasures which they have done so 
much to preserve against a hostile 
or uncaring world. 
But "trivializing" is, in my judg-
ment, the only word for what 
happens when consciences are 
bound to a particular theory of cos-
mic or human origins, when the 
strata and structures of the planet 
are accounted for by ingenious and 
often ingenuous speculations about 
what an unprecedented and un-
repeatable universal deluge might 
accomplish, when imprecatory 
psalms are forcibly baptized into 
expressions of Christian piety, when 
chronologies and family trees are 
covered by a warranty of inerrancy 
since to question their accuracy 
might raise doubts about whether 
God really was in Christ, recon-
ciling the world to Himself. 
The Bible deserves better than 
that. At the very least, it deserves 
to be taken with full seriousness as 
the world's greatest and, in some 
ways, most varied anthology of lit-
erature. It can be read as literature, 
and perhaps it would be well for us 
to do so before we begin to use it as 
a source of information and doctrine. 
It does, after all, make quite some 
difference whether a particular piece 
of writing is a myth, a song, a drama, 
a sermon, a collection of wise say-
ings, an eye-witness account of 
events, a theological treatise, or a 
piece of apocalyptic writing. Failure 
to discern the literary genre can get 
us into the position of taking liter-
ally things that were probably meant 
more figuratively, and, worse still , 
taking figuratively hard things 
that were meant all too literally. 
But the ultimate test of meaning 
in the Scriptures is not literary, but 
theological. "They are they which 
testify of Me," said the Word made 
flesh. What truth the early chapters 
of Genesis have to tell us is not 
about the rocks or the origins of 
life, but about Jesus Christ. If it' 
rocks that preoccupy you, there are 
a number of excellent geology text 
that will serve you better than 
Genesis. Cl 
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